Visual cryptography with cheating shares by Huang, Shanfeng
Lakehead University
Knowledge Commons,http://knowledgecommons.lakeheadu.ca
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Retrospective theses
2006
Visual cryptography with cheating shares
Huang, Shanfeng
http://knowledgecommons.lakeheadu.ca/handle/2453/3686
Downloaded from Lakehead University, KnowledgeCommons
VISUAL CRYPTO GRAPH Y  




A thesis submitted to the faculty of graduate studies 
Lakehead University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Masters of Science in Computer Science
Department of Computer Science 
Lakehead University 
A pril 2006
Copyright ©  Shanfeng Huang 2006





395 Wellington Street 






395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 
Canada
Your file Votre référence 
ISBN: 978-0-494-24057-1 
Our file Notre référence 
ISBN: 978-0-494-24057-1
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non­
exclusive license allowing Library 
and Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non­
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats.
AVIS:
L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive 
permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, 
distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans 
le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, 
sur support microforme, papier, électronique 
et/ou autres formats.
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in 
this thesis. Neither the thesis 
nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission.
L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse.
Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de 
celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation.
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this thesis.
Conformément à la loi canadienne 
sur la protection de la vie privée, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont été enlevés de cette thèse.
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 
any loss of content from the 
thesis.
Canada
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans la pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Contents




1.1 Statement of Visual Cryptography............................................................  1
1.2 Contribution of This Thesis....................................................................... 2
1.3 Outline of The Thesis............................................................    3
2 Secret Sharing Scheme 4
2.1 IVaditional Secret Sharing scheme.......................................   4
2.2 The Comparison w ith Visual Cryptography ............................................  6
3 Naor and Shamir’s Scheme 7
3.1 The M o d e l...................................................................................................  7
3.2 2 out of 2 Visual C ryptography.................................................................  9
3.3 The General k out of k Schemes................................................................  9
3.4 The General k out of n Schemes................................................................  10
4 Improved Contrast Visual Cryptography Schemes 12
4.1 Blundo, D ’Aero, Stantis and Stinson’s Scheme...........................................  12
4.1.1 The Model........................................................................................  12
4.1.2 Basic Matrices.................................................................................  13
4.1.3 Canonical (k,n)-threshold V C S ......................................................  14
4.1.4 Contrast Optimal (k,n)- threshold V C S ........................................ 16
4.2 Duong Quang Viet and Kaoru Kurosawa’s Scheme.................................. 19
4.2.1 M o d e l..............................................................................................  20
4.2.2 Basic Id e a ........................................................................................  21
4.2.3 Proposed Scheme ...........................................................................  22
4.2.4 Perfect W hite V C S .........................................................................  25
m
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 Colored Visual Cryptography Schemes 27
5.1 Ching-Nung Yang and Chi-Sung Laih’s Scheme.........................................  27
5.1.1 Basic Colored V C S ........................................................................... 27
5.1.2 A Colored k out of n VCS ..............................................................  29
5.2 Young-Chang Hou’s Scheme........................................................................ 31
5.2.1 Basic Principles of C olors................................................................  31
5.2.2 Three Algorithms for Colored Visual Cryptography......................  32
6 Implement Visual Cryptography by Other Methods 38
6.1 P.Tuyls, H.D.L.Hollmann, J.H.v.Lint,
L.Tolhuizen’s Scheme..................................................................................  38
6.1.1 M o de l................................................................................................  38
6.1.2 Threshold Visual Secret Sharing Schemes.......................................  41
6.1.3 General k out of n visual secret sharing schemes  ....................  42
7 Visual Cryptography with cheating shares 45
7.1 Attack Statement................................................................    45
7.2 Visual Authentication and Identification Application............................  49
7.2.1 Visual Authentication Scheme ........................................................  49
7.2.2 The Proposed Method for Visual Authentication Scheme..............  53
7.2.3 Comparison....................................................................................  55
7.3 M odel............................................................................................................ 56
7.4 Attacks w ith different levels........................................................................ 57
7.4.1 Partially Successful A tta c k ..............................................................  57
7.4.2 Completely Successful A tta ck ..........................................................  59
7.5 Visual Cryptography Scheme Application.................................................  59
7.5.1 Definition and Setting.........................................   59
7.5.2 Grey Background M ethod...........................................  61





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
List o f Figures
1.1 A Simple Example of 2 out of 2 Visual Cryptography..............................  2
3.1 subpixels of 2 out of 2 visual cryptography ............................................... 9
4.1 Proposed (2,2)-V C S (l)................................................................................. 22
4.2 Proposed (2,2)-VCS(2)................................................................................. 23
4.3 Perfect white (2,2)-VCS..............................................................................  26
5.1 the infrastructure of colored subpixel and its OR operation(l) ................ 28
5.2 the infrastructure of colored subpixel and its OR operation(2) ................ 29
5.3 Three colored (3,3)-VCS’s subpixels for color 0 ......................................... 30
5.4 Color image prin ting..................................................................................... 33
5.5 Scheme 1 of color cryptography..................................................................  34
5.6 Scheme 2 of color cryptography..................................................................  35
5.7 Scheme 3 of color cryptography............................................    36
6.1 Structure and principle of an LC display. .................................................  39
6.2 Visual cryptography system by superimposing two LC layers.....................  40
6.3 Tables for the model.....................................................................................  40
7.1 Original text w ith secret information “EF” .................................................  46
7.2 Shares after E ncryp tion ............................................................................... 46
7.3 Normal resulting image after D ecryption.............................    47
7.4 Share 3 changed from sharel by the tra ito r ...............................................  47
7.5 The changed resulting image w ith different information ” FE” .................. 47
7.6 (a)The bounding box depicted on user’s transparency (b) The composed
im age....................................................    51
7.7 Many-times visual authentication scheme...................................................  53
7.8 Success Attack w ith false share ..................................................................  54
7.9 M odel............................................................................................................  56
7.10 The attacks on the grey p ixe l......................................................................  62
7.11 The improved method for Visual Cryptography Scheme..........................  62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Preface
Visual cryptography is a technique that applies the human visual system to decode 
encrypted information, such as text, image and number, w ithout any sophisticated 
devices and computing capabilities. Therefore, compared w ith the traditional cryptog­
raphy, it  is apparent that it  saves a large amount of time and money on devices and 
computations. Also, visual cryptography provides the convenience for humans to carry 
out decryption w ith a portal card which is significant to the business application. In 
the past decade, visual cryptography has been thoroughly researched not only on its 
contrast and subpixel expansion, but also on its apphcations.
The main contribution of this thesis is the security of visual cryptography related 
to the dishonest shareholders. This is the first known work concerning this variety 
of potentially secure problem. In the previous papers, the shareholders are inherently 
honest. However, in the real world, it  is impossible to guarantee that every shareholder 
would be honest forever(e.g., because of the interest of business or m ilitary, some 
shareholders might change to be the traitors). Therefore, a new method based on 
visual authentication[16] is proposed and the improvement is also made. In this thesis, 
we also review the previous papers on different fields of the visual cryptography.
VI
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Statement of Visual Cryptography
Suppose that five thieves have their loot deposited in a numbered Swiss bank account. 
As the thief, They do not trust each other and they separately escape to different 
countries. Also, it  is assumed that three or more of them do not implement the 
conspiracy of taking the money out w ithout any authorization and any three of them 
are able to withdraw the money. Therefore, they divided the secret (bank account 
number and password) into shares and from any two or less of them cannot get any 
information about the secret, but from any three shares they can reconstruct the secret. 
However, there is tw ist that the thieves do not know any cryptology knowledge and w ill 
not have a computer when withdrawing the money, so they would like the decryption 
to be visually. Obviously, the solution is visual cryptography.
Visual Cryptography is proposed by Naor and Shamir in 1994 [17]. Compared w ith 
the traditional cryptography, visual cryptography is a new technique which allows the 
visual information, such as text, image and number, to be encrypted in a secure way 
and the decryption is implemented by human visual system, even without any com­
plicated devices and cryptology knowledge. As we all known, the reliable traditional 
cryptography depends on a number of sophisticated computations and advanced com­
puters. However, in visual cryptography, the encryption is implemented by splitting 
the secret text into shares so that after stacking these shares printed on the transparen­
cies carefully by shareholders, they are able to reconstruct the secret. The Figure 1.1 
clearly shows the process of visual cryptography.
As a matter of fact, visual cryptography that is a special instance of threshold 
secret sharing scheme [14] is also called visual secret sharing scheme. In k out of n 
visual cryptography, the secret is broken up into n shares and the decryption can only 
be done by k or more shareholders after superimposing their transparencies. Moreover, 
any A: — 1 or less shareholders can not obtain any information about the secret even 
w ith powerful cryptology capabilities. We w ill elaborate the secret sharing scheme in 
Chapter 2 as cryptographic background.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
HEY! cn-22ial text
share 2share. 1 spukdna
stackàîs
secret text
Figure 1.1; A  Simple Example of 2 out of 2 Visual Cryptography
1.2 Contribution of This Thesis
In the previous papers, most researchers were concentrated on two directions of visual 
cryptography: contrast and subpixel expansion which improve the quality of recon­
structed image. However, the security of visual cryptography is ignored. The share­
holders in the previous literatures are inherently assumed to be honest. Therefore, it 
would never happen that the shareholders might change from honesty to dishonesty. 
However, in real world, due to the variety of reasons such as the interest of business 
and m ilitary, the shareholders are unable to keep their loyalty for ever. Thus, we have 
to take this potential attack into account.
In this thesis, we w ill focus on the case when some of the shares are changed by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
the traitors. For example, the traitors alternate the black pixels to the white ones and 
vice versa. Then after stacking the qualified number of shares, the resulting image 
w ill be naturally considered as the original image though it  has been changed. In  fact, 
it is not difficult for traitors to alternate the shares which are printed on the whole 
transparency. In  our thesis, the visual authentication method proposed by Naor and 
Pinkas [16] is applied to prevent such kind of attacks. Furthermore, we propose a math 
model to discuss the distinct situations and improve the method in a novel way to 
reduce the possibilities of successful attacks.
1.3 Outline of The Thesis
The remainder of thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the origins, 
principles and applications of secret sharing scheme that make us understand visual 
cryptography better. From Chapter 3 to Chapter 6 we review the previous visual 
cryptography schemes including the contrast improvement, colored scheme and another 
method to implement the visual cryptography. In  Chapter 7 we propose our method 
and in Chapter 8 the conclusion is made.
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Chapter 2
Secret Sharing Scheme
2.1 Traditional Secret Sharing scheme
Secret sharing scheme is a method which allows a secret to be shared among a finite 
set of participants in such a way that only qualified subsets of participants can recover 
it[21]. I t  is discovered independently by Shamir[l] and Blakley[12] and it  aims at 
establishing a secure key management. Here Blakley’s scheme is a probabihstic method 
based on the linear projective geometry and thus we introduce the Shamir’s scheme 
only. Virtually, in many situations, there exists a key that provides an access to some 
important files. Therefore, if  the key is forgotten by the available person or known by 
saboteurs, then all the important files become inaccessible or dangerous. In  order to 
avoid this type of danger, the secret sharing scheme is designed based on polynomial 
interpolation. The basic idea of secret sharing scheme is dividing the secret key into 
pieces and distributing the pieces to different persons. Moreover, in terms of the 
previous definition, it  is no doubt that secret sharing scheme is called perfect because 
unqualified group of participants can not obtain any information about the secret.
As a very simple example, consider the following situation that includes a dealer 
and n participants. Also, the number of the qualified subset of participants is specified 
by m (l <  m < n). Then this is a general m out of n secret sharing scheme. In such a 
scheme, the dealer divides the secret into n parts and deliveries each participant a part 
so that any m or more participants can put together their shares to recover the secret, 
but any m — 1 or less participants do not suffice to determine the secret. Actually, 
different choices for the values of m and n reflect the tradeoff between security and 
reliabifity. Now let us take a look at Shamir’s secret sharing scheme which is perfect 
just described.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is a threshold secret sharing scheme that makes use 
of the arithmetic over the finite field GF{q) and m — 1 degree polynomial
m—1f{x )  =  ao +  aix  +  ... +  am-ix'
where ao is the secret and other coefficients are random elements in the fields. The field
is known to every participants. Each share holds a pair of numbers (%,,%) satisfying
4
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CHAPTER 2. SECRET SHARING SCHEME
Vi =  f{x i) ,X i ^  0. Moreover, any m or more shares can uniquely determine the 
polynomial and ao is able to be computed. However, any m — 1 or less shares can not 
figure out the polynomial uniquely, and hence the secret is any element in the field. 
Therefore, Shamir’s scheme is a perfect secret sharing scheme.
A concrete secret sharing scheme is constructed as follows: We assumed an example 
of 4 out of 10 threshold scheme on Zzmu w ith key equals 71. Therefore, the parameters 
m, n, q, K  are 4,10,31874,71 respectively.
•  Initialization Phase : The dealer(D) chooses 10 distinct, non-zero elements of Zq, 
denoted a;̂  =  i, 1 <  i  <  10 (this is where we require 31847 > 11). For 1 < i  <  10, 
D gives the value Xi to each participant (Pj) . The values x, are public.
Share Distribution: Suppose D want to share a K  
secretly chooses (independently at random) m — 1 =
3,02 =  5,03 =  7. For 1 < i  <  10, D computes y* = 
K  +  a ix i -h ... +  am-iXm-i mod 31847 as follows:
= 71 belongs to Z31847. D 
3 elements of Z31847, oi =  
: /(x i)  in terms of f(x )  =











For 1 <  % < 10, D gives the share y,- to  P, 
point (xi, yi) on this polynomial.
So every participants Pj obtains a
Secret Reconstruction; In  order to recovery the secret, we should assemble the 
qualified number of persons. Actually, at least 4 participants is required in the 
example. Suppose that the participants P i, P3, P4, Pg want to determine K. They 
know the pair of numbers (Xj, y,) where i  € {1 ,3 ,4 ,8}. Since /(x )  has the 
degree at most 3, /(x )  can be written as /(x )  =  Oq +  a\X +  a^x^ -f a^x^ where 
the coefficients 00, 01,02,03 are the unknown elements and oq =  AT is the key. 
Obviously, Xi — i ,  So the following equations are obtained.
Oq "H Oi +  02 +  03 =  86
oq 4- 3oi +  9o2 +  27og =  314 
Oo 4- 4oi 4“ I 602 4" 64og =  611
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clq +  8o% +  64(22 4“ 512(23 =  3999
This equation system does have a unique solution in the field Z31874 : oo =  
71, o i =  3, O2 “  5, 03 =  7.
Also, we could verify the perfection of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. Assumed 
that only 3 participants put their shares together. Proceeding as above, we are 
able to acquire the following equation systems.
Oo 4- (2i 4- 02 4- 03 =  86
Oq 4" 3oi 4“ 9o2 4" 27og =  314
Oq 4" 4oi 4" 16q2 4" 64og =  611
However, we cannot compute the coefficients directly because we finally obtain 
the equation Oo4-1203 =  155. Apparently, 03 is chosen randomly in the field, and 
hence the oq cannot be computed.
2.2 The Comparison with Visual Cryptography
Although we refer to the traditional secret sharing scheme as the perfect scheme, it 
sustains a few disadvantages when making the comparisons w ith the visual cryptogra­
phy-
•  Convenience: Generally, in the traditional secret sharing scheme, we require a 
computer or even more advanced devices to implement the decryption. In visual 
cryptography, only the transparency is necessary for the participants to take. 
Therefore, visual cryptography is much more convenient for the shareholders.
•  Popularity: As we all known, we are not able to decrypt the secret w ithout the 
good capabilities of cryptographic knowledge and computations in traditional 
secret sharing scheme. However, the visual cryptography merely ask the share­
holders to pool together their shares and recognize the secret by their natural 
visual system. Undoubtedly, this property strengthen the popularity of visual 
cryptography.
•  Security: The shares are usually stored in the computers for traditional secret 
sharing schemes. I t  may easily be attacked or destroyed by hackers through 
the internet. In some sense, it  is relatively securer for shareholders to keep the 
physical shares in visual cryptography.
On the other hand, visual cryptography is of less practical importance than tradi­
tional secret sharing scheme. But it  is a hot topic in the cryptographic research fields. 
In next Chapter, we w ill describe it  in  details.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 3
Naor and Shamir’s Scheme
Since the discovery of visual cryptography by Shamir and Naor [17] in 1994, it  has 
been developed by a great number of researchers and become a hot topic in  the cryp­
tographic researches. In the past decade, the m ajority of papers were focused on the 
improvements of visual cryptography which make the resulting text or image more 
legible for the shareholders. More specifically, in most of the papers regarding the 
black-and-white image, it  depends on the contrast and subpixels expansion. As a mat­
ter of fact, these two fields have received more and more attentions and a great progress 
has been made by the researchers [18, 5, 8, 24, 3, 2].
For color images, due to the complexity of the color pixels, the researchers were 
trying to find different effective ways to make them well recognizable. However, it  
is more difficult to establish a perfect visual cryptography scheme for color images. 
The colored k out of n visual cryptography scheme sharing a colored image is first 
introduced by Verheul and Van Tilborg [9]. Although some methods of constructions 
for colored visual cryptography were proposed in the proceeding years, there s till exist 
many drawbacks.
Moreover, the cryptologist began to explore different methods to implement the 
visual cryptography. The original visual cryptography proposed by Shamir and Naor 
is based on the the element-wise or-ing of binary matrices. Now, in terms of the 
principles of lights, a new method succeeds in carrying out the visual cryptography 
and obtaining a better resulting image.
In this chapter, we w ill review the Naor and shamir’s schemes. From chapter 4 to 6, 
the schemes w ill be introduced from the above three directions: Contrast improvement, 
colored visual cryptography and the novel methods of visual cryptography.
3.1 The Model
A t the beginning of [17], Naor and Shamir bu ilt up a model consisting of a printed page 
of ciphertext (which can be sent by mail or faxed) and a printed transparency (which 
serves as a secret key). Also, they assume that the message consists of a collection 
of black and white pixels and each pixel is handled separately. Each original pixel
7
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appears in n modified versions (called shares) one for each transparency. Each share 
is a collection of m black and white subpixels, which are printed in close proxim ity 
to each other so that the human visual system averages their individual black/white 
contributions.
Then the construction is described by an n x m m atrix S =  [S'jj] where Sij =  1 if  
the j th  subpixel in the *th transparency is black. When transparencies i i , i 2,..., ir  are 
stacked together in a proper way, we can see a combines share whose black subpixels 
are represented by the Boolean ” or” of the rows.
Definition 3.1. Hamming Weight: the number of non-zero symbols in a symbol 
sequence. For binary signaling, Hamming weight is the number of 1 bits in the binary 
sequence.
According to the definition, the grey level of the combined share is proportional to 
the Hamming Weight (represented by H(V)) of the ” or” ed m-vector V. Moreover, it 
is interpreted by the visual system of the users as black if  H(y) >  d and as white if  
Hiy)  <  d — am  where some fixed threshold 1 <  d <  m and relative difference a  > 0.
Definition 3.2. A solution to the k out of n visual secret sharing scheme consists 
of two collections of n x  m Boolean matrices Cq and Ci. To share a white pixel, the 
dealer randomly chooses one of the matrices in Cq, and to share a black pixel, the dealer 
randomly chooses one of the matrices in Ci. The chosen matrix defines the color of 
the m subpixels in each one of the n transparencies. The solution is considered valid i f  
the following three conditions are met:
1. For any S in C q, the or V  of any k of the n rows satisfies H (V ) < d  — am.
2. For any S in Ci, the or V  of any k of the n rows satisfies H{V) >  d.
S. For any subset of {1,2, ...,n } with q < k, the two collections o fq xm
matrices Dt fo r t  Ç {0, 1}  obtained by restricting each n x m  matrix in Ct (where 
t  =  0 , 1)  to rows i i , i 2, ■■■,iq ore indistinguishable in the sense that they contain 
the same matrices with the same frequencies.
Condition 3 implies that by inspecting fewer than k shares, even an infin ite ly pow­
erful cryptanalyst cannot gain any advantage in detecting whether the shared pixel 
was white or black. In most of their constructions, there is a function of such that the 
combined shares from q <  k transparencies consist of all the Vs w ith H { V )  =  f{q)  
with uniform probability distribution, regardless of whether the matrices were taken 
from Cq or C%. Such a scheme is called uniform. The first two conditions are called 
contrast and the th ird condition is called security.
There are some important parameters in this scheme:
•  m: the number of subpixels in a share. This represents the loss in resolution 
from the original pictures to the shared one. I t  should be as small as possible.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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•  a: the relative difference in weight between combined shares that come from a 
white pixel and a black pixel in the original picture. This represents the loss in 
contrast. I t  should be as large as possible.
•  r  : the size of the collection C q and C i  (they need not be the same size, but in all 
of our constructions they are). loQr represents the number of random bits needed 
to generate the shares and does not effect the quaUty of the picture.
3.2 2 out of 2 Visual Cryptography
Virtually, 2 out of 2 visual cryptography is a special case of original problem of visual 
cryptography. In this scheme, one pixel is split into two subpixels. However, in practice 
this method can distort the aspect ratio of the original image. Therefore, four subpixels 
are recommended to strengthen it. In 2 out of 2 visual cryptography, four subpixels 
are arranged in 2 x 2 array as Figure 3.1 describes.
In Figure 3.1, a white pixel is shared into two identical arrays of the list, and a black 
pixel is shared into complementary arrays from the list. Obviously, any single pixel is 
a random choice of two black and two white subpixels that look grey. After stacking 
the shares together, the result is either grey that represents white or completely black 
that represents black.
E 9  m m  5 0
\'erltcal Shares Diagonal Shares
Figure 3.1: subpixels of 2 out of 2 visual cryptography
3.3 The General k out of k Schemes
In this paper, Naor and Shamir proposed two constructions by using subpixels 2*̂  and 
2*”  ̂ respectively for a general k out of k scheme.
C onstruction  3.3. To define the two collections of matrices, two lists of vectors 
J i, Jg,..., and J l, J l, —, Jk ore used.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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•  Let J f, be vectors of length k over GF[2] with the property that every
k — \  of them are linearly independent over GF[2], but the set of all k vectors is 
not independent. For instance, let J f =  fo r 1 < i  <  k and =  1^~^0.
•  Let J \ ,J l, . . . ,J l be vectors of length k over GF[2] with property that they are 
linearly independent over GF[2].
•  Each list defines a A; x 2  ̂ matrix fo r t 6 {0 ,1} and the collection Cq and Ci 
are obtained by permuting the columns of the corresponding matrix in all possible 
ways. Index the columns of by vectors of length k over GF[2]. F o rt E {0 ,1 }, 
let be defined as follows:
= <  J f,x  > fo r any I  <  i  <  k and any vectors x of length k over GF[2] 
where < x , y >  denotes the inner product GF[2].
Lemma 3.4. The above scheme is a k out of k scheme with parameter m =  2*“, a  =  J f, 
and r  =  2 !̂
C onstruction  3.5. Consider a ground set W  =  {c i,e2, ...,ek} of k elements and let 
7Ti, 7T2, be a list of all the subsets of W of even cardinality and let 01,02, ...,o^~^
be a list of all the subsets of W of odd cardinality (the order is not important).
Each list defines the following k x 2*~  ̂ matrices S'® and S^: For 1 <  i  <  k and 
1 < j  <  2*’~̂  let S®[i,j] =  1 i f f  Ci Ç. TTj and S ^ [i,j] — 1 i f f  Ci Ç. oj. As in  the 
construction above, the collections Cq and C i are obtained by permuting all the columns 
of the corresponding matrix.
Lemma 3.6. The above scheme is a k  out o fk  scheme with parameters m — —
2& r, and r  =  2*’~M
Theorem  3.7. In  any k out of k scheme, a < and m >  2^~^
3.4 The General k out of n Schemes
The k out of n scheme is derived from the k out of k scheme. Let C be an A: out of 
k visual secret sharing scheme w ith parameters m, r, a. The scheme consists of two 
collections of A: x m Boolean matrices Cq =  and C\ — T l,T f,.. . ,T } .
Furthermore, assume the scheme is uniform, i.e. there is a function f{q ) such that for 
any matrix I j  where t  E {0 ,1 } and 1 < i  < r  and for every 1 <  g <  A; -  1 rows of 
T f the Hamming weight of the ” or” of the q rows is f{q). Note that a ll the previous 
constructions have this property.
C onstruction  3.8. Let H  be a collection of I functions such that
1. Any h Ç: H  satisfies: { l...n } —> {1...A;}
2. For all subsets B in { l...n } of size k and fo r all 1 <  q < k the probability that a 
randomly chosen h E H  yields q different values on B is the same. Denote this 
probability by /?,.
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Constructing from C and H  a k out of n scheme C  as follows:
•  The ground set is V — U x H  (i.e., it  is of size m x  I and consider its elements 
indexed by a member of U and a member of H ).
•  Each I < t  < r '' is indexed by a vector { t i , t2, •■■,ti) where each X < t i < r .
•  The matrix 5* fo r t — {ti, tg, ...,ti) where b € {0 ,1} is defined as
th means the hth entry in t, where h is simply interpreted as a number between 1 
and I.
Lemma 3.9. I f  C is a scheme with parameters m, a, r, then C  is a scheme with 
parameters m' =  m •/, a ' =  o; -/?*;, r ' =  rL
Theorem  3.10. For any n and k there exists a visual secret sharing scheme with 
parameters m =  n'° • a =  (2e)~^/V'27rfc and r  =  n*(2*“ ^!).
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Chapter 4
Improved Contrast Visual 
Cryptography Schemes
As previously described, the parameter of contrast called a  should be as large as 
possible. Thus, in [18, 5, 8, 3, 24], the authors present different approaches to improve 
the contrast of the reconstructed image in visual cryptography. In this section, two of 
papers w ill be introduced in details.
4.1 Blundo, D ’Acro, Stantis and Stinson’s Scheme
In[5], the researchers analyzed the contrast of the resulting image for (&, n)-threshold 
visual cryptography. They not only defined a canonical form for k out of n visual 
cryptography but also provided its characterization.
A t first, they conclude two parameters which characterize the visual cryptography: 
pixel expansion, which is the number of subpixels each pixel of the original image is 
encoded into, and the contrast which measures the ’’difference” between the white and 
black pixels in the resulting image. Then a model is proposed to solve the problem of 
contrast.
4.1.1 The Model
As a matter of fact, the pre-conditions are the same as the Naor and Shamir’s scheme[17]. 
However, there are some differences between their definitions.
D e fin itio n  4.1. Let k and n be two integers such that k < n and Let V  be a set of n 
participants. Two collections (multisets) of n x m  boolean matrices C q andCi constitute 
a {k, n)-threshold visual cryptography scheme with pixel expansion m i f  there exist the 
value a{m) and the set {(X ,£ x )}x c 7>:|x|=fc satisfying:
1. Any (qualified) set X  =  {4 , *2, Q V  can recover the shared image by
stacking their transparencies. Formally, fo r any M  E C q, the ”or” V of rows
12
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hriz, satisfies H {V ) < tx  — ot{m) • m; whereas, fo r any M  E Ci it  results 
that Hiy) >  tx-
2. Any (forbidden) set X  =  ...,ip} Ç  V, with p < k, has no information
on the shared image. Formally, the two collections of p x m matrices T>t, with 
t 6 { 0, 1}, obtained by restricting each n x m  matrix in Ct t rows i \ , i2, —, ip, are 
indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same 
frequencies.
The value a{m) is called contrast of image and the set { (X ,ix ) }x ç 7’:|x|=fc is called 
the set of thresholds. The slightly different terminology is used in [17] where the 
contrast is called relative difference and the quantity a{m) • m is referred to as the 
contrast of the scheme. Therefore, as previous, the product of the contrast times the 
pixel expansion should be as large as possible and at least one, that is, a{m) >  Also, 
in fact, the model is a generalization of the one proposed in [17], since w ith each set 
X of size k they associate a (possibly) different threshold tx- However, in this paper, 
there is a property that for any X , X ' Ç V  w ith |X | =  jX ') >  A: so that tx  =  tx '-
4.1.2 Basic Matrices
In the paper, all the collections of Go and C\ are considered as the same size, tha t is,
I Go] =  }Gi). A ll the constructions are realized by two n x m  matrices, 5® and S^, called 
basis matrices satisfying the following definition.
D e fin itio n  4.2. Let k and n be two integers such that k <  n and let V  be a set of n 
participants. A (k,n)-threshold Visual Cryptography Scheme with contrast a(m ) and 
set of thresholds {(X,£x)}xcr»:|xi=fe is realized using the two n x m  basis matrices 5° 
an i f  the following two conditions hold.
1. I f  X  — { i i ,  «2, •••,*&} Q 'P, (i-e., i f  X  is a qualified set), then the ”or” V o f rows 
i i , i 2,-- , ik  of satisfies H {V ) <  £% — o:(m) • m; whereas, fo r it  results that
2. I f  X  =  { h , i2, --rip} Q P  andp < k (i.e., i f  X  is a forbidden set), then the two 
p x m  matrices obtained by restricting 5® and to rows i\, %2, —, V are equal up 
to a column permutation.
The collections Go and Gi are obtained by permuting the columns of the corre­
sponding basis m atrix in all possible ways. The algorithm for the visual cryptography 
scheme based on the previous construction of the collections Go and Ci has small 
memory requirements (it keeps only the basis matrices 5® and S^) and it  is efficient( 
to choose a m atrix in Go( Gi,resp.)) it only generates a permutation of the columns of 
S'®( S'̂ ,resp.).
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4.1.3 Canonical (k,n)-threshold VCS
In this section, the basic matrices containing all the columns of a given weight each 
occurring w ith the same frequency w ith few additional properties are considered. More­
over, these matrices are referred to as canonical Since the authors are interested in 
optimizing the contrast w ithout lost of generality.
The notations are set up firstly by authors. Let m be an n x m matrix and let 
X  C { 1, ...,n } and Z Ç { 1, Let M [X ][Z \ denote the |X | x \Z\ matrix obtained
from M  by considering its restriction to rows and columns indexed by X  and Z, 
respectively. Let M  be a m atrix in the collection Cq [J Gi of a (fc, n)-threshold VCS 
on a set of participants V. For X  Q V, let M x  denote the m-vector obtained by 
considering the or of the rows corresponding to participants in X ; whereas M [X ] =  
M [X ][{1 ,..., m }] denote the jX | x m m atrix obtained from M  by considering only the 
rows corresponding to participants in X . Let M  be a m atrix and let D  be a sub-matrix 
of M  having the same number of rows, w ith M \ D  is denoted by the m atrix obtained 
from M  by removing all the columns of the m atrix D. For sets X  and Y  and for 
elements x and y, to avoid the overburdening the notation, x is written for {x }, xy for 
{x ,y }, xY  for { x } ( jF ,  and X Y  for X (J F . Let c be a boolean vector, w ith c they 
denote the vector obtained from c by complementing all its entries; whereas, given a 
boolean m atrix M  w ith M  they denote the m atrix obtained from M  by complementing 
all its entries. For i  — 0,1, w ith fc,i they denote the m ultip licity of the column c in 
S \  that is, fc,i is the number of times the column c appears in S \ By abusing of the 
notation, they write c G M  to denote the fact that c is a column of the matrix M .
D e fin itio n  4.3. Let (S^, S^) he the basic matrices of a (k,n)-threshold VCS. They are 
in canonical form if, fo r  * =  0, 1, the following two properties are satisfied.
1. For any columns c and c ’ such that H{c) — H{cf), it  results that fc,i =  /c ’,»-
2. For any column c i t  results that
(4.1)
i f  k 18 a odd.
A {k, n)-threshold VCS whose basic matrices are in canonical form is referred to as 
a canonical {k, n)-threshold VCS.
Theorenu 4.4. Let S^ and S  ̂ be two n x m  boolean matrices. The matrices 5® and 
are basic matrices of a {k,n)-threshold VCS with pixel expansion m and contrast a(m) 
i f  and only i f  fo r all subsets X  consisting o fk  rows there exist a boolean matrix D ^  
and integer z% > «(m ) • m such that D ^  is a sub-matrix of both 5®[X] and S^[X), all 
the even columns appear in  5®[X] \  D ^ with multiplicity z%, and all the odd columns 
appear in F^[X] \  D ^ with multiplicity z%.
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Lemma 4.5. Let be the basis matrices of a {k,n)-threshold VCS with pixel
expansion m and contrast a. The matrices (B®, B^), defined as
are the basis matrices of a {k, n)-threshold VCS with pixel expansion m and contrast 
a.
Then, the following Lemma is obtained by the previous Theorem 4.4 and Lemma
4.5.
Lemma 4.6. Let Co and C\ be the collections of matrices of a {k, n)-threshold VCS 
with contrast a. Then, there exists a canonical (k,n)-threshold VCS realized by basic 
matrices (5®, S^) having contrast a.
In  any canonical {k, n)-threshold VCS, all the columns of a given weight appear 
w ith the same m ultiplicity. So, Aj,, is defined as the m ultip licity of a column of weight 
j  in S \  i.e., =  fc,i if  w{c) =  j .  Hence, any canonical (A, n)-threshold VCS can be
simply described by the pair of vectors (Ao.o, —, An,o) and {Ao,i,..., A„,i). Clearly, the 
pixel expansion m of a canonical (fc, n)-threshold VCS is equal to
m (4.3)
Moreover, in  a canonical (A, n)-threshold VCS, for any X , X ' C V, w ith |X | =  
jX 'l =  k, the tx  ~  tx> holds as in the original definition by Naor and Shamir[17].
C oro lla ry  4.7. Let be a (k,n)-threshold VCS in canonical form. I f  k is odd, then 
fo r j  =  0, ...,n , it results that hjfl =  whereas, i f  k is even, fo r j  =  0, ...,n , it
results that Ay Q =  hp—y Q and Ay  ̂ =  A,̂ —y %.
There is another equality regarding the Ay's which is based on the security of the 
(A, n)-threshold VCS.
i=l \  /  i=i X '
Hence, in any canonical (A, n)-threshold VCS all the rows of the basis matrices 
have the same weight. The next corollary is an immediate consequence of previous 
observation and of Lemma 4.6.
C o ro lla ry  4.8. The pixel expansion of any canonical (k,n)-threshold VCS is twice the 
weight o f any row of a basic matrix.
Lemma 4.9. S{ho) and S{hi) are basis matrices of a {k,n)-threshold VCS with pixel 
expansion m and contrast a i f  and only i f  the following properties are satisfied:
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1- T .U  ( j )  =  T . U  0 )  N i  =  rn.
2- E m Y  ( ” z l )  N i ,  / o r l < l < k - l a n d O < l ' < l ,
A E ?o‘  ( "  :  * ')  (No -  N i )  =  am.
Example 4.10. Suppose k =  2 and n =  4. JLef ho — (3,0,0,0,3) and let h i =  
(0,0, 1,0,0). This defines a (2, 4) threshold VCS with m =  6 and contrast a  =  1/3;
g O ) ^ ^ = ( a ) 3 + ( 4 ) 3  =  6
è ( - ) v = ( ^ ) i  =  6
E  ( ■ ) % " = ( 0 ) 3  “ 3
E 0 ) v = Q i  =  3 
E  ( j )  ® =  ( 0 )   ̂-  (2 )   ̂ ^
In view of Lemma 4.6, if  we are interested in getting a scheme w ith a given contrast 
or bound on the contrast itself, then we can restrict our attention to canonical (A, n)- 
threshold VCS. Therefore, the following (A, n)-threshold VCS are considered as the 
canonical (A, n)-threshold VCS unless otherwise specified.
4.1.4 Contrast Optimal (k,n)- threshold VCS
The same column cannot appear in both basic matrices of a contrast optimal (A, n)- 
threshold VCS. Indeed, if  the same column appears in  both basic matrices, then by 
removing it  we obtain a new scheme having a better contrast than the one we started 
with. This property implied the following fact.
Fact 4.11. In any contrast optimal (k,n)-threshold VCS whose basic matrices are in  
canonical form, fo r j  =  0,..., n and % =  0, 1, i t  holds that,
1. I f  >  0, then Ayy =  0.
2. I f  k is even, then hj,i — hn-j,%-
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S. I f  k is odd, then hj,i =
As a result of above fact and because of the Corollary 4.7, if  n is even and k is odd 
then hn/2,0 — hn/2,1 =  0.
C ontrast O p tim a l (n — l,n )-th re sh o ld  VCS
In this section, the contrast optimal (n — l,n)-threshold VCS is characterized by the 
authors.
Lemma 4.12. Let n >  3. In  any contrast optimal (n — l,n)-threshold VCS whose 
basis matrices are in canonical form, the hVs satisfy:
1. hjfi > 0  i f  and only i f  either j  <  n /2  and j  is even or j  > n /2  and j  is odd.
2. > 0 i f  and only i f  either 3 <  n /2  and j  is odd or j  >  n /2  and j  is even.
Lemma 4.13. For any n >  3 and fo r any contrast optimal canonical (n—1, n)-threshold 
VCS the pixel expansion m is given by
n (  ^  \ J,
M  /o 1 euen
m = <  \  (4.5)
n I , , , ] i f  n is odd.
\ ( n - l ) / 2^
Lemma 4.14. For any n >  3 and fo r any canonical (n — l,n)-threshold VCS the 
maximum contrast a is given by
a — <
)]  ̂ i f  n is even
”  , \  (4-«)
According the previous lemma one has that in any contrast optimal (n — l,n )- 
threshold VCS a — 0 (2 ""n “ ^/^). This is lower contrast than an (n, n)- threshold 
VCS.
C ontrast O p tim a l (3, n)-th resho ld  VCS
For any n >  4 and any integer 1 < g < n/2, consider the visual cryptography scheme 
whose basic matrices are in canonical form, denoted by S{8,n,g), described by the 
following h j/s .
ho,0 =  Ar,.l -  g _  1)  hn~g,Q ~  Ag.l =  1 (4.7)
whereas a ll the remaining hj / s  are equal to zero. This is a strong (3, n)-threshold VCS 
as shown by the following theorem.
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Theorem  4.15. For any n >  4 and any integer 1 <  g < n /2, the scheme S{Z,n,g) 
described by (4-7) is a strong (Z,n)-threshold VCS having pixel expansion and contrast 
equal to
m =  2 W  a =  (4-8)
respectively.
Theorem  4.16. Let n geqA. In  any {3, n)-threshold visual cryptography scheme it  
holds that
a <
2(n — l)(n  — 2)
A Canonical (4, n)-threshold VCS
For any even n >  4 and any integer 1 <  g <  n /2, consider the visual cryptography 
scheme whose basic matrices are in canonical form, denoted by S{4,n,g), described by 
the following h j/s
(nV /l)
Aji/2,0 ~  in,g, and hĝ i ~  =  y ;ÿr ‘ tn,g (4.10)(:::)
where tn,g =  - ^ l) ^  the remaining h j/s  are
equal to zero. This is a strong (4, n)-threshold VCS as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.17. For any even integer n > 4 and any integer I  <  g <  n/2, the scheme 
S{A,n,g) is a strong {4, n)-threshold VCS having pixel expansion and contrast equal to
- ■ ( . n - * , )  - • - y: , ' »'»
respectively.
Remark 4.18. Theorem 4-17 holds only when n is even. I fn  is odd, then, by applying 
the technique given in Theorem 4-17, we construct a {4,n-\-l)-threshold VCS, and then 
consider only first n rows of the basis matrices of such scheme. Therefore, fo r any 
n > 4 and any integer 1 <  g < n /2, there exists a strong {4, n)-threshold VCS having 
pixel expansion and contrast equal to
respectively.
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A Canonical (5, n)-threshold VCS
For any two integers I and g such that 1 < f < g < n/2, the (5, n)-threshold VCS 
whose basis matrices are in  canonical form, denoted by <S(5, n, Z, g), is described by the 
following h j/s :
h g f i  =  =  t ( n , l , g ) j  h n - l , 0  ~  ~  ®(n,2,g)> 0̂,0 “  ^n,l =  f ( n , l , g ) )  (4.13)
where . . . .
/  n — 4 \  /  n — 4 \
, _____________ V - V  V - a j ___________
I 4)1  -  ‘ ( -M  ( "  j  **) "  ( s  -  4 )  ’
and all the remaining h j/s  are equal to zero.
Theorem 4.19. For any two integers I and g such that 1 <  I <  g <  n/2, the scheme 
S{S,n,l,g) is a canonical {5,n)^threshold VCS having pixel expansion and contrast 
equal to
m v . w [ ( " )  +  ( "  i  4)1 +  +  ( s  -  4)  -  C  / ) '
and
l(g — l){n  — g)(n — 2g)(n — 2Z)
a
2(n +  21 ~  2g)(n — l)(n  — 2)(n — 3)(n — 4) ’ 
respectively.
In this paper, the authors analyzed the contrast of the reconstructed image for 
(fc, n)-threshold VCS. Moreover, they put forward a canonical form for VCS and provide 
several {k, n)-threshold VCS w ith fe =  3,4,5 having an optimal contrast.
4.2 Duong Quang Viet and Kaoru Kurosawa’s Scheme
A t the beginning of this paper[8], the author points out the reason which causes the 
loss of contrast in visual cryptography. In fact, in the previous VCS, no black sub­
pixel can be made into white because transparencies are simply superimposed in the 
reconstruction phase. This is the essential reason of a much loss of contrast in  the
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reconstructed image. Consequently, this paper shows a new paradigm of VCS in which 
the original image is almost perfectly reconstructed.
In the proposed method, a very simple non-cryptographic operation is assumed, 
reversing the black and white, which many copy machines have these days. A ll the 
black region is reversed into white and all the white region is reversed into black by 
this operation. Namely, it  is called a (k, n)-VCS w ith reversing.
4,2.1 Model
A (k, n)-visual cryptography scheme (VCS) consists of a distribution phase and a re­
construction phase. Let /  be a secret image which consists of black and white pixels 
F.
In the distribution phase, a dealer P  encodes each pixel P  into n shares sx,..., s„, 
one for each transparency. P  then gives a* to participants Pi for * =  1, ...,n.
In  the reconstruction phase, any k participants F*,,..., reconstruct I  by super­
imposing their transparencies. That is, the reconstructed pixel is given by
F  =  Sjj +  Sjj -f ... -4- Sjj.,
where -f means OR. However, any fc — 1 participants have no information on / .
Each Si consists of m sub-pixels, where m is called the expansion rate. Hence Si is 
described by a Boolean vector of length m
Vi ~  (CjjX) •••)^,m))
where Q j =  l i f  the j- th  subpixel is black. Let C ~  [ c * b e  the n x m Boolean m atrix 
w h i^  consists of üi, ..., That C  is the encoding m atrix of F. _
F  is interpreted as black if  wh{P) is large, and as white if  Wh {P) is small, where 
wh{P) denotes the Hamming weight of F. The grey level of a pixel F  is defined as
G F E y(F ) =  w ^(F )/m ,
where F  =  white or black. GKEY(white) should be close to zero and GREY(Wacfc) 
should be close to one. In  Naor and Shamir’s 2 out of 2 VCS, the grey level of a black 
pixel and a white pixel are
G F E y(N o a ) =  l,G F E y(w W e ) =  1/2.
The contrast is ideal if
G FE y(W aa) =  l,G F E T (w W e) =  0.
A (k, n)-VCS is perfect black if
G FFy(W act) =  1 and G FFy(w fi*^e) <  1.
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The (n,n)-VCS shown by Naor and Shamir [17] is perfect black. The expansion rate is 
m =  2” “  ̂ and they showed it  is optimum. For any 2 < k  < n ,  Biundo et al. showed a 
perfect black {k, n)-VCS such that
GREY (white) =  1 — 1/m
for some expansion rate m [2].
4,2.2 Basic Idea
In this section, the authors show a basic idea of their schemes. They present a (2,2)- 
VCS w ith reversing such that GREY (white) =  1/4 in addition to GREY(Wocfc) =  1. 
So it  improves the contrast because GREY(white) =  1/2 in [17].
D e fin itio n  4.20. An image I  is reversed i f  all black pixels are reversed into white and 
all white pixels are reversed into black. Denote by P the reversed pixel of P  and by I  
the reversed image of I .
The scheme is described as Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.
•  (D is trib u tio n  phase)
1. The dealer 2? runs the distribution phase of Naor and Shamir’s (2, 2)~VCS 
twice independently. Let (si, sg) denote the shares of the first run and 
(sx, Sg) denote the shares of the second run.
2. Now in the scheme, the share of participant Fx is (sxi'sl) &nd that of par­
ticipant Fz is (s2,Sa)
•  (R econstruction phase)
1. Two participants superimpose Si,$2, and obtain T =  Si +  Sg. Similarly, 
they superimpose (s^,S2 and obtain T ' — s[ +  gg. They are illustrated in 
the Figure 4.2.
2. They next reverse T, T'and obtain T  and T ' as shown in Figure 4.2.
3. The two participants superimpose T, T ' and obtain T  4- P .
4. Finally the two participants reverse T  +  T ' and obtain T  +  V .  The T  +  T ' 
is the reconstructed image of the scheme.
Now as we can see from Figure 4.2, we obtain that GREY(black) ~  1 and 
E [G R ET(w m e)] =  (1/2) x  04- (1/2) x (1/2) =  1/4.
The reasons are listed as follows. Suppose that a pixel P  is white. Then
1. T  and T ' are always black as shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Proposed (2,2)-VCS(l)
2. Therefore, T  andP are always white as shown in Figure 4.2.
3. Therefore, T  +  P  is always white.
4. Hence T  +  P  is always black.
On the other hand, suppose that a pixel P  is a white. Then
1. As shown in Figure 4.1, T  and P  are grey such that a half region is black and 
the other half is white in each one of the four cases.
2. Therefore, T  and P  are grey such that a half region is white and the other half 
is black in each one of the four cases as shown in Figure 4.2.
3. Therefore, T +  T ' is black w ith probability 1/2 and grey(half black and half 
white) w ith probability 1/2. This is because (si, Sg) and (s'ljSg) are generated 
independently and randomly.
4. Hence T  -f P  is a ll white w ith probability 1/2 and it  is grey( half black and half 
white) w ith probability 1/2.
4.2.3 Proposed Scheme
In  this section, they show their (k, n)-VCS w ith reversing. The reconstruction of black 
region is perfect and the reconstruction of white region is almost perfect. The cost is 
the size of shares. I f  the size of shares is c times larger, then the grey level of white 
region converges to zero exponentially.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4. IMPROVED CONTRAST VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHEMES23
1 1 / * I  (  ■ f i r
1 1/j -  : l T x a a a D
; >  — .2-‘> C [J■ □
! >  -  .2-1 a D ■ □
i >  -  .2-7 C D D a
; y  — 1 □ □ n
Figure 4.2: Proposed (2,2)-VCS(2) 
c-Run (k, n)-VCS  with Reversing
Suppose that there exists a perfect black (k, n)-VCS. Then construct a ” c-run (k, n)~ 
VCS w ith reversing ” as follows in which the underlying (fc,n)-VCS is run c times 
independently.
Let P be a secret pixel to be distributed.
(Distribution phase)
1. The dealer P  runs the distribution phase of the underlying perfect black (k,n)- 
VCS c times independently. Let ..., s„,j)be the set of shares in the i-th  run 
for i  =  1, ...,c.
2. In the scheme, the share of participant Pj is
(Reconstruction phase) Any k participants, say F ji, Pj,,, reconstruct P as follows.
1. For Î =  1,..., c, they superimpose their shares and obtain
T i — ...,
2. They reverse p  and obtain TÏ for i =  1, ...,c.
3. They superimpose Ti,...,Tc and obtain U =  + •...+  5^.
4. Reverse U and obtain P, where
Obviously, any k -  I  participants have no information on P from the property of the 
original {k, n)-VCS.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4. IMPROVED CONTRAST VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHEMES24 
Contrast
It is easy to see that G ÎŒ Y (black) =  1 because the original VCS is perfect black. 
Now we show that both E[GREY(white)] and Var[GREY(white)] converge to zero.
Theorem 4.21. Suppose that GREY(white) ~ q < \  in the original perfect black 
VCS. Then in our c-run VCS with reversing.
(1)  E [G REY(whüe)] =  q̂ .
Corollary 4.22, There exists a perfect black (2,2)-VCS with reversing such that
E[GREY(white)] =  (1/2)'’
V o r[G R ^y(w h ite )] <  (1/2)'={1 -  (1/2)'’}
with the expansion rate m =  2, where c is any positive integer.
For general (k, ra)-VCS, they obtain the following corollary from [2].
Corollary 4.23. For any 2 <  k <  n, there exists a perfect black (k,n)-VCS with 
reversing such that
E [G REY(wkite)] =  (1 -  1/m)'’
Var[G REY(white)] < (1 -  l/m ) '’{ l  -  (1 -  1/m )'’}  
fo r any positive integer c, where m is the expansion rate given by [2j.
Example 4.24. AS an example, we present a 3~Run (2,2)-VCS.
(Distribution phase) The Dealer V  runs the distribution phase of (2,2)-VCS in 
[17] three times independently. Let (s i, gg) be the shares of the first run, (s^jSg) be the 
shares of the second run and (s'(, s'f) be the set of shares of the third run.
Then the share of participant V i is (sx, s'x, s'[) and that of participant %  is (gg, s'f).
(Reconstruction phase)
1. We superimpose Sx and S2, and then obtain T  =  sx +  sa- Similarly, we obtain 
T ' =  s'x +  2̂ and T " =  s" +  Sg.
2. we reverse T, T ' and T", and obtain T, T ' and T".
3. we superimpose T, T ', T " and obtain U = T  + T ' -f-T".
4. We reverse U and obtain P.
(Contrast): We can then see that G R E Y ^lack) =  1 and
Æ![GRjBY(wh:te)] =  (1/4) x (1/2) +  (3/4) x  0 =  1/8
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4.2.4 Perfect W hite VCS 
Conversion from  Perfect B lack VCS
A (k, n)-VCS is perfect white if
G R E Y  (white) =  0 and G IŒ Y  (black) >  0
In usual pictures, the white region is much larger than the black region. Therefore, 
perfect white VCSs are much preferable that perfect black VCSs. However, no perfect 
white VCS has been known. In this section, we show that a perfect white (fc, n)-VCS 
with reversing is easily obtained from a perfect black (k, n)-VCS (w ith reversing).
Theorem  4.25. Suppose that there exists a perfect black (k,n)-VCS with reversing 
such that E[GREY(white)J =  p. Then there exists a perfect white (k,n)-VCS with 
reversing such that E[GREY(black)J =  1-p.
A lm ost Ideal C on trast w ith  P erfect W h ite
We can obtain a perfect white (k, n)-VCS w ith reversing such that
E[GREY(Wacfc)] 1
by applying Theorem 4.25 to our construction shown in section 4.2.3.
In this case, we can reduce the number of reversing from c +  1 to c by terminating 
at step 3 of the reconstruction phase. The U of step 3 is the reconstructed image.
p ix e l  P .S , .<2 .V, i .s^ .*i 1 ‘ .S'l
■ J ) . J D B B a
P =  . “j a n B
□ E a ■ □
p  “  S) n B ■ □
Figure 4.3: Perfect white (2,2)-VCS
Exam ple 4.26. As an example, we show how to convert the perfect black (2,2 )-VCS 
into a perfect white (2,2) — VCS with reversing.
(Distribution phase):
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1. the dealer T> first reverses the original image I. Hence each white pixel is reversed 
into black and each black pixel is reversed into white.
2. V  then applied the distribution phase of the perfect black (2 ,2)-VCS. Participant 
V\ obtains a share Si and participants V2 obtains a share sz-
(Reconstruction phase):
1. the two participants superimposes Si and S2 and obtains s i +  sz-
2. They finally reverse si +  sz and obtains Si +  sz
From Figure 4 .3, we see that a perfect white (2,2)-VCS is obtained such that GREYiblack) 
1/ 2.
In this paper, the authors make use of the non-cryptographic operation to obtain 
the almost ideal contrast. I t  w ill be a further work to find another simple and similar 
method for improving the contrast.
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Chapter 5 
Colored Visual Cryptography 
Schemes
In  the previous researches, the m ajority of literatures was focused on the black-and- 
white secret image. However, it  did not satisfy the requirement of the real world. 
Although the colored secret image has caught the attention of many researchers, there 
are not many papers regarding the colored image yet. In this chapter, we w ill introduce 
two of [9, 4, 27, 26, 23] which involve different methods to carry out the colored (fc, n)-
vcs.
Verheul and Van Tilborg [9] proposed a general construction, making use of the 
concept of arcs, for a colored VCS scheme so that the participants are able to share 
the colored secret image.
In the following sections, two colored schemes w ill be elaborated. One is put forward 
by the C. N. Yang and C.S. Laih, and Y.C.Hou established another.
5.1 Ching-Nung Yang and Chi-Sung Laih’s Scheme
In  this paper, the authors define a different structure of the colored subpixels so that 
the previous black-and-white VCS can be easily modified and extended to construct 
the colored VCS.
5.1.1 Basic Colored VCS
I f  the smallest graphic unit in a colored picture is called pixel, the key concept o f VCS 
is to transform the pixel to b sub pixels of color 0,1,..., c — 1. The infrastructure of 
colored sub pixels is shown in Figure 5.1.
A circle subpixel w ith a sector of angle 27t / c  is called a color i  subpixel where the 
sector has color i  and the other part in the circle is black. Although the color black 
might be one of the c colors, it  is always distinguishable from the c colors. Figure 
5.1(b) shows that ” 0R ” of elements equals color i, i f  a ll elements are color i, otherwise 
it  equals color black. For a colored (fc, n) VCS, the dealer produces n transparencies
27
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Co.orl' I rn lc r r - l W.h-’,
(a) Represenuiiion o f r cclors and bi^ck color
0 . , .  0  
0 - 0 . 0 I fb" f f j  )
"OR
(bj -he operation or “ OR" between ciTeren: tolors 
Figure 5.1: the infrastructure of colored subpixel and its OR operation(l)
and each pixel in transparency contains b subpixels. The color of one pixel in stacked 
transparencies is dependent on the interrelation between the stacked(" OR" ) subpixels. 
I f  all subpixels are of color i, then one sees color i, otherwise one sees black color.
Definition 5.1. A k out of n c-color VSS scheme S — {Cq,Ci,...,Cç-i), consists of c 
collections o fn x b  q-ary matrices, in which the c colors are elements of the Galois field 
GF{q). To share a pixel of color i, the dealer randomly chooses one of the matrices 
in Ci . The chosen matrix defines the color of the b sub pixels in each one of the 
transparencies. The solution is considered valid i f  the following three conditions are 
met fo r all 0 <  i  <  c — 1:
1. For any S in Ci , the OR v of any k of the n rows satisfies Zi(v) >  h, where 
V is a vector with coordinates in c colors and black color, and Zi(v) denotes the 
number of coordinates in v equal to color i.
2. For any S in Q  , the OR v of any k of the n rows satisfies Zi{v) <  I, fo r j  ^  i.
3. For any <  ... <  is in  {1,2, with s <  k, the collections of s x b
matrices D j ,  for j  6 {0, l,...,c  — 1} obtain^ by restricting each n x b matrix 
in Cj to rows ...,ig  are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the 
same matrices with the same frequencies.
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Note that h > I and b is the block length of a colored VCS. The cardinalities of 
the Ci are denoted as r  and must coincide. The first two conditions can be called 
color ensuring that stacking k transparencies w ill reveal the original color of the pixel. 
The last condition is called security implying that fe — 1 or fewer transparencies give 
absolutely no information about the shared secret. The value of h and I determines 
how good the revealed secret image is, and the value of b determines the resolution of 
the original picture.
5.1.2 A Colored k out of n VCS
Actually, the color i  circle subpixel w ith a sector or color i and the other sector of black 
color cannot be directly used in the image editing package. The infrastructure of the 
modified color subpixels is shown in Figure 5.2.
C-;:li<r ) C c l o r ( V l n i , - K ix'lc .v.'li'-
(a) Rcprcsv'iilt.'iüt Ol’ c cukus i.t.ii Waok aùyr
LI L  ‘ If
I ‘ I "Ok" 1/ I No di,‘fir.itk)n uhci: i.7, îl'iiîc.'îsc 




fb) Tbc opcrauon of "O R " bcavcci", different coior.s .vid tine color biack
Figure 5.2: the infrastructure of colored subpixel and its OR operation(2)
Now we describe the construction based on the new infrastructure of colored sub­
pixels. In the scheme, the block length 6 =  m x c, where c is the number of colors and 
m is the share size of the used black-and-white (fc,n)-VCS.
Construction 5.2. Let Bq and B \ be the two n x m  Boolean white and black matrices, 
respectively, as defined in conventional black-and-white {k,n)-VCS. The parameters are 
the share size m, the Hamming weight of any k of the n rows in black share matrix 
h', the Hamming weight of any k of the n rows in white share matrix I', and h' >  
I'. Then, a colored {k,n)-VCS with c colors has the n x (c x m) matrices Ci, i  6 
{0 ,1,..., c ~  1} and Cj — {  all the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of
(0— j ̂ ( 0 —* ;  1 —**) I 1^(0—’ia .l—.*)
I— fohereji ~  jc - i G {{0 ,1 , ...,c—1}—{*}}. The subscript (0 —> i; 1 —> 
*) means that the elements 0 and 1 in Bo or B i are replaced by i and *, respectively. 
The * denotes the black color.
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Theorem  5.3. The scheme from Construction 5.2 is a colored (k,n)-VCS with ”c” 
colors and the parameters are b ~  c x m, h — m — V, Z =  m — fe'.
Note that we can delete all the * columns to improve the block length so that 
we w ill have teh slightly better results. This improvement is shown in the following 
Lemma.
Lemma 5.4. The scheme from Construction 5.2 can be improved with the parameters 
b =  ctimesm- {the number of all-1 columnss in B q }  -  (c — l ) x {  the number of all-1 
columns in B i}
A colored (fe, fe)-VCS is just a particular case of Construction 5.1. Here, we w ill 
use the optimal construction of a black-and-white (fe, fe)-VCS to construct a colored 
(fe,fc)-VCS. The colored VCS w ill have the block length b — c x 2*’“^, where c is the 
number of colors.
R*: .7 1 Rev.' 2
rc-v. H
Figure 5.3: Three colored (3,3)-VCS’s subpixels for color 0
Exam ple 5.5. The three 3 x 10 matrices Co, Ci and be constructed as follows. First, 
review the Bq and B i in optimal black-and-white (3,3)-VCS as follows:
Since
'0 1 0 1> 
R o= (O 1 1 0 
lO 0 1 1,
R i
[jg(0—*0:1—**) j jÿ(0—>I;1—♦*) 1^(0—.2;!—>*)]
T O O L  
0 1 0  1 
,0 0 1 ly
0 * 0 *  *11 *  * 22*  
0 *  *01 * 1 * 2 * 2*  
00 *  *11 *  *22 *  *
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then we delete all-* columns Finally, we get
(0 * 0 * *11 * 22\0 *  *01 *  12 *  2 j
00 *  *11 *  22*  J 
/ I  * 1 * *00 * 22̂
Cl =  by permuting thecolumns o f j 1 * *10 * 02 * 2
y 11 * *00 *  22*
/ 2 * 2 * * 0 0 * i r
Cz =  by permuting thecolumns o f  \ 2 * *20 * 01 * 1
y 22 * *00 * 11*
The share of a colored (3,3) VCS with three colors are further described in Figure 5.3. 
A pixel color 0 share by three shadows is divided into 10 subpixels as shown in Figure 
5.3(a). Figure 5.3(b) and (c) show the results of stacking any two rows and a ll three 
rows, respectively.
5.2 Young-Chang Hou’s Scheme
In [26], the researchers combined the previous results in [27] which involves the color 
decomposition principle and halftone technology to develop the algorithms of visual 
cryptography for colored secret image.
5.2.1 Basic Principles o f Colors
First the author review the basic principles of colors: The additive and subtractive 
models are commonly used to describe the constitutions of colors. In additive system, 
the primaries are red, green and blue(RGB), w ith desired colors being obtained by 
mixing different RGB components. By controlling the intensity of red (green or blue) 
component, we can modulate the amount of red (green or blue) in  the compound light. 
The more the mixed colored-lights, the more is the brightness of the light. When 
mixing all red, green and blue components w ith equal intensity, white color w ill result. 
The computer monitor is a good example of the additive model.
In the subtractive model, color is represented by applying the combinations of 
colored-lights reflected from the surface of an object (because most objects do not 
radiate by themselves). Take an apple under the natural light for example. The 
surface of the apple absorbs green and blue part of the natural light and reflects the 
red light to human eyes, so it  becomes a red apple. By mixing cyan (C) w ith magenta 
(M) and yellow (Y) pigments, we can produce a wide range of colors. The more the 
pigment we add, the lower is the intensity of the light, and thus the darker is the light. 
This is why it  is called the subtractive model. C, M and Y are the three prim itive 
colors of pigment, which cannot be composed from other colors. The color printer is a 
typical application of the subtractive model.
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In computer systems, Application Interfaces (APIs) provided by most image pro­
cessing software as well as the Windows operating system are based on the RGB model. 
This is mainly because they use monitors as the primary output media. Monitors them­
selves generate color images by sending out RGB light into humans retina. In true color 
systems, R, G, B are each represented by 8 bits, and therefore each single color of R, 
G, B can represent 0 — 255 variations of scale, resulting in 16.77 m illion possible col­
ors. When using (R, G, B) to describe a color pixel, (0;0;0) represents fu ll black and 
(255; 255; 255) represents fu ll white.
In visual cryptography, we use sharing images as the decryption tool; that is, the 
final outputs are transparencies. Because the subtractive model is more suitable for 
printing colors on transparencies, we w ill use the CMY model to represent colors in 
what follows. Because (R, G,B) and (C, M, Y) are complementary colors, in  the 
true color model, (R, G, B) and (C, M, Y) possess the Following relationships: C  =  
255 — R ,M  ~  255 — G ,Y  =  255 — B. Thus, in the (C, M, Y) representation, (0; 0; 0) 
represents fu ll white and (255; 255; 255) represents fu ll black.
Because most color printers use C, M, Y  ink to display color, a color image must 
be processed by the color-decomposed procedure before printing. Color decomposition 
mainly is to separate 0 , M, and Y  colors from colors w ithin every pixel of the image. 
These three components form three monochromatic images. These monochromatic 
images are like gray-level images in which every pixel has its own color level and has 
to be transformed into a halftone image before printing. The three monochromatic 
halftone images w ill be (cyan, white), (magenta, white) and (yellow, white) binary 
images, respectively. A fter stacking these images, a ll kinds of the colors in  the original 
image can be displayed. Figure 5.4 illustrates the procedure of printing color images.
We can see from the figure that every pixel Pij of the composed color image P is 
obtained by combining the corresponding pixels C ij,M ij,Y ij in the three C, M , and 
Y  separating halftone images, where C, M, and Y images are all binary. For any 
pixel, Cij, M ij or Y^, there are only two possible values: blank or not blank, where 
0 denotes blank, and 1 denotes the corresponding color. Hence Py has the following 
possible combinations: (0; 0; 0), (1; 0; 0), (0; 1; 0), (0; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), ( I; 0; 1), (0; 1; 1), and 
(1;1;1), where Py(0;0;0) denotes a white pixel, and (1;1;1) denotes a black pixel. 
Because C, M, and Y are prim itive colors in the subtractive model, they retain the 
usual characteristics that C (M or Y) plus C (M or Y) is C (M  or Y ), C (M or Y ) plus 
white is C (M or Y), and white plus white is white, when stacking them on transparent 
media. In the following sections, we w ill introduce our three methods for color visual 
cryptography.
5.2.2 Three Algorithms for Colored Visual Cryptography
In this section, three methods w ill be introduced. For simplicity, the schemes and 
algorithms are shown as follows.
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Ongmaiinwge
Color decomposiuon 
C M Y I
Halfiouf image •
Figure 5.4; Color image printing
M eth o d  1
The method uses the procedure illustrated in Figure 5.4 to transform a color secret 
image into three C, M, and Y  halftone images. Then, every pixel of the halftone images 
is expanded into a 2 x 2 block. Every block of the sharing images therefore includes 
two transparent (white) pixels and two color pixels so that the entropy reaches its 
maximum to conceal the content of the secret image. Furthermore, we design a half 
black-and-white mask to shade unexpected colors on the stacked sharing images so 
that only the expected colors show up.
Take Figure 5.5 for example. If  pixel Fÿ of the composed image is(0; 0; 0), the 
distribution of the color pixels in the three sharing images is assigned as the first row in 
Figure 5.5. After stacked by the mask image, all the color pixels on the three sharing 
images are shaded by black pixels and only the white pixels can reveal, thus showing 
a white-like color. If  pixel is (1; 1; 0), only the C and M  components are revealed, 
with the Y  component being covered by the black mask. The distribution of the color 
pixels in the three sharing images is as the fifth row in Figure 5.5, thus showing a 
blue-liked (cyan plus magenta) color. If  pixel Py is (1; 1; 1), the C, M, and Y  parts 
can all be revealed, thus showing a black color. The distribution of the color pixels in 
the three sharing images is as the eighth row in Figure 5.5. The eight combinations of 
the three primary colors of the composed image under this method are illustrated in 
Figure 5.5.
A lgorithm  5.6. 1. Transform the color image into three halftone images: C, M ,
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Figure 5.5: Scheme 1 of color cryptography
and Y.
2. For each pixel Pij with color components (C ij, M ij or Y ij)  of the composed image 
P, do the following:
•  Select a black mask with a size o f 2 x 2 ,  and assign a black pixel randomly 
to two of these fou r positions and leave the rest positions blank (transparent 
or white). This step w ill make the black mask a half black-and-white block.
•  A fte r selecting a mask, determine the positions of the cyan pixels in  the block 
of the corresponding sharing images. This is done according to the positions 
of the black pixels in  the mask and the value of C ij .
I f  C ij =  1 (the cyan component w ill be revealed), f i l l  the positions corre­
sponding to the positions of the white pixels in  the mask with a cyan pixel 
and leave the rest positions blank.
I f  C ij =  0 ( the cyan component w ill be hidden), f ill the colors in  the opposite 
way. That is, f il l  the positions corresponding to the positions of the black 
pixels in  the mask with a cyan pixel and leave the rest positions blank. 
Finally, add the block to the corresponding position of Share 1.
•  In  accord with the above step, determine the positions of magenta pixels of 
the block in  Share 2 with the value of M ij and those in  Share 3 with the 
value of Y ij.
S. Repeat Step 2 until every pixel of the composed image is decomposed, hence obtain­
ing fou r transparencies (cyan, magenta, yellow and black) of visual cryptography 
to share the secret image.
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4. A fte r stacking the fou r sharing images, the secret image can be decrypted by 
human eyes.
M eth o d  2
A lgorithm  5.7. 1. Transform the color image into three halftone images: C, M ,
and Y.
2. For each pixel Pij of the composed image, do the following:
•  Expand a 2 x 2  block in  Share 1 and f i l l  the block with cyan, magenta, yellow, 
and transparent randomly.
•  Generate a 2 x  2 block in Share 2 according to the permutation o f the four 
colors of the block in  Share 1 and the values of C ij, M ij,  Yij , and determine 
the color distribution of the corresponding block in Share 2 as illustrated in  
Figure 5.6.
3. Repeat Step 2 until every pixel of the composed image is decomposed, hence ob­
taining two visual cryptography transparencies to share the secret image.
4- A fte r stacking two sharing images, the secret image can be decrypted by human 
eyes.
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Figure 5.6: Scheme 2 of color cryptography
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M eth o d  3
In order to alleviate the inconvenience of Method 1, which needs four sharing images, 
and the loss of image contrast under Method 2, the third method is established.
This method needs only two sharing images and does not sacrifice too much contrast 
for color visual cryptography. It  transforms a color secret image into three halftone 
images C, M, and Y  and exploits the technique of gray-level visual cryptography to 
generate six temporary sharing images Ci, C2 , M i, Mz, Yi, and Tg. Each of these sharing 
images will have two white pixels and two color pixels in every 2 x 2  block; i.e. all the 
color quantities are 2/4.
Shared ShareC2ShareM I ShareM2SbareYl S!iarcY2
Shares
■  Rœomtructed 
bW
Figure 5.7: Scheme 3 of color cryptography
A lg o rith m  5.8. 1. Transform the color image into three halftone images: C, M ,
and Y.
2. For each pixel Pij o f the composed image, do the following:
•  According to the traditional method of black-and-white visual cryptography, 
expand C ij, M y und Yy into s ix2  x  2 blocks, C L j,  (72^;
M l i j ,  M 2 ij and Y  l,y, Y 2 ÿ .
•  Combine the blocks C U j , M l i j  and Y l^  and f ill  the combined block corre­
sponding to P ij in  Share 1.
•  Combine the blocks C 2 ij,M 2 ija n d  Y 2 ij and f i l l  the combined block corre­
sponding to Pij in  Share 2.
S. Repeat Step 2 until every pixel of the composed image is decomposed, hence ob­
taining two visual cryptography transparencies to share the secret image.
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4 . After stacking the two sharing images, the secret image can be decrypted by human 
eyes.
Although this paper only involves the (2,2) or simple VCS, it  can also be easily 
applied to the k out of n VCS and the extended schemes for visual cryptography.
Prom the previous literatures about the colored visual cryptography, we can find 
that there w ill be much more further work deserved to research.
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Chapter 6 
Implement Visual Cryptography by 
Other M ethods
The conventional visual cryptography proposed by Naor and Shamir is based on the 
” 0R ” operation of the columns of the basic matrices. However, it  is not the unique way 
to implement the visual cryptography because some researchers found other effective 
and efficient approaches.
In [22], the authors present an optical method for visual cryptography using phase 
masks and an interferometer. Moreover, in [25], neural networks is used in the novel 
approach for implementing the visual cryptography. Here, another new method w ifi 
be described in  details in following sections.
6.1 P.Tuyls, H.D.L.Hollmann, J.H.v.Lint, 
L.Tolhuizen’s Scheme
The new visual cryptography system proposed by these authors in this paper uses the 
polarization of light and has good color, contrast, and resolution properties.
This method is based on two well-known physical principles: 1) Polarizers only 
transmit light whose polarization is aligned w ith the one of the polarizer (sunglasses) 
and 2) Liquid Crystal(LC) cells can be used to rotate the polarization direction of 
incoming light.
A t first, the authors set up a model for the visual cryptography system.
6.1.1 Model
In order to introduce the model, they explain the physics of an LC display w ith black- 
light. An LC display consists mainly of four layers (Figure 6.1). The first one has 
the black light. The second layer consists of a polarizer, the th ird one is the LC layer 
and the fourth one consists again of a polarizer. The black emits circularly polarized 
light. The first polarization layer projects the polarization of the incident light on its
38
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polarization direction. Depending on the voltage that is applied to a LC cell, this 
LC cell w ill rotate the polarization of the light that enters it  over a certain angle. I f  
the polarization direction of the light leaving the LC-layer matches that of the final 
polarizer, light comes out of the display. I f  one the other hand the polarization of the 
light coming out of the LC is perpendicular to the polarization direction of the final 
polarizer, no light comes out. By applying voltages to the LC-cell such that the polar­
ization direction of the outcoming light makes an angle 0 < tt/ 2 w ith the polarization 

















Figure 6.1: Structure and principle of an LC display.
In  Figure 6.1, the symbol r in a cell means that this LC cell rotates the polarization 
of the incoming light. In order to build a visual cryptography system based on LC 
displays they proceed as follows(Figure 6.2). There are two displays consisting of an 
LC layer which have a polarizer at one side and no polarizer at the other side. Also, 
assume that the first LC has the blacklight and the second has not. The second display 
has to be considered as a dedicated trusted device that a user is carrying w ith  him. 
The shares of both users are then the two(or more) LC layers on which the dealer 
writes a certain pattern in terms of the angle of rotation of the various LC cells.
Assume that the direction of the first polarizer equals that of the second polarizer 
and is horizontal. Furthermore, assumed that two voltages can be applied to LC cells 
Vy and V2. When the voltage Vy is applied, the LC cell w ill not rotate the polarization 
direction of the incoming light, while when the voltage V2 is applied, the polarization 
direction is rotated over an angle of 90 degrees. When an LC consists of N pixels 
(LC cells), one share w ill basically consist of N voltages (corresponding to the angle 
of rotation of the different cells). In Figure 6.3, Table 1 summarizes the physics for 
one pixel. I t  follows from Table 1 that when two superimposed LC cells apply the 
same rotation, this generates a white pixel and when they rotate the polarization over 
a different angle this generates a black pixel.
I f  an LC does not rotate the polarization of the incoming light, then we w ill denote 
this by a 0. I f  on the other hand the polarization is rotated over 90 degrees by the
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Figure 6.2: Visual cryptography system by superimposing two LC layers.
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Figure 6.3: Tables for the model
LC cell, this w ill be denoted by a 1. This means that the mathematical structure of 
the system is that of binary addition as follows from Table 2 in Figure 6.3. The visual 
encryption scheme corresponds then to the physic implementation on LC layers of the 
One Time Pad based on an XOR operation. As LC layers can be driven electronically 
(as in LCD’s), the key can be easily updated( using pseudo random number generators), 
which leads to a practical updating mechanism.
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6.1.2 Threshold Visual Secret Sharing Schemes
In this section, the threshold visual secret sharing scheme based on the polarization 
rotation technique as explained in section 6.1.1 w ill be constructed. Here, only the 
black-and-white images are considered.
Following from the definition of the conventional visual cryptography, for a vector 
V e G F{2y , we denote by z{v) the number of zero entries in the vector v (note that 
z{v)+w{v) =  b, where w{v) denotes the Hamming weight of the vector v). A k out of n 
threshold visual secret sharing scheme(TVSS) S =  (Cq, C i) consists of two collections 
of n X b binary share matrices Co and C i,
D e fin itio n  6.1. Let k, n, b, h, I be positive integers satisfying 1 < k < n  and b >  h > I.
A [{k,n)]b ,h,l] TVSS scheme consists of two collections o f n x b  boolean matrices Cq 
and C l such that:
1. For any s € C q, the XOR v of any k of the n rows of s satisfies z{v) >  h.
2. For any s E Ci, the XOR v of any k of the n rows of s satisfies z{v) <  I.
3. For any <  *2 < ••• < {U  3., n } with t  < k the two collections o f t x b
matrices T>j fo r j  € {0 ,1 }, obtained by restricting each n x b  matrix in Cj, fo r
j  =  0,1, to rows *i,*2, ...,4  are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain 
the same matrices with the same frequencies.
h is called the white level of the system and I is called the black level. The parameter 
b is called the block length and determines the resolution of the scheme.
P roposition  6.2. Let S =  (Cq,Ci) be a [{k,n)-,b,h,l] TVSS scheme with k odd and 
let Ci be obtained from C, be replacing zeros by ones and vice versa. Then, the scheme 
S =  (Co, Ci) is a [(fc, n)',b,b — l,b — h] scheme with contrast c,
c = ( h - l ) / { 2b - l ~ h ) .
I t  follows that c >  c whenever I +  h >  b.
P roposition  6.3. Let S =  (Co, C i) be a [{k,n)-,b,h,l] TVSS scheme with k > 3  and 
let Cl and cg be two rows of a share matrix in Co and hence also two rows of a share 
matrix in C \. Then,
d{ci, C2) <  m in {2l, 2(6 — h)} 
where d(.,.) denotes the Hamming distance.
n ou t o f n v isua l secret sharing
In this section, we can show that (n, n) TVSS schemes can have maximal contrast (c 
=  1) w ith minimal block length (b =  1).
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P roposition  6.4. Let Co and C\ be two sets o f n x l  matrices defined as follows.
n  n
Co =  {s e (C f (2 ) r  10 s, =  0}, C l =  {s e (C F(2))"| 0  =  1}.
i= l  i= l
Then, the scheme S =  (Co,Ci) is a [(n,n); 1, 1, 0] TVSS scheme.
Hence, in this set-up there exist visual encryption schemes w ith good contrast and 
resolution properties. This stands in sharp contrast w ith OR-based visual cryptography 
systems where maximal contrast schemes can only exist if  6 > 1.
(2,n) TVSS Schemes
A general construction for (2, n) TVSS schemes is given by the following theorem. It 
shows that (2, n) TVSS schemes are equivalent to binary codes. By a (6, n, d) code, we 
mean a binary code of length 6, n words and minimum Hamming distance d.
Theorem  6.5. Let b,l be natural numbers with b > 1 and 0 <  I < b . A [(2, n );6 ,6, Z] 
TVSS scheme exists i f  and only i f  there exists a binary (6, n,b — I) code C.
C oro lla ry  6.6. The contrast of a [(2, n); 6, b, I] TVSS scheme is at most
{b — log2n +  1)/(6 +  log2U — 1)
6.1.3 General k out of n visual secret sharing schemes
In this section, two constructions of {k,n) TVSS scheme for all 3 <  A: <  n — 1. The 
first construction is recursive, the second one is a direct construction and based on 
so-called MDS codes known from algebraic coding theory.
C onstruction  1
Firstly we emphasize that in all of the following constructions we produce two classes of 
share matrices consisting of n rows called Co and C \. In each step of the construction we 
w ill let the permutation group Sn act on the n rows of the share matrices in Co and C%. 
The appropriate permutation group S w ill act on the columns of the share matrices Co 
and C l. This ensures the indistinguishability property according to Definition 6.1 for 
the sets Co and C i. In all constructions, assumed that this is done without mentioning 
this.
The idea of the construction is the following. Denote by o* the weight of the sum 
of any 1 < i  <  k rows of a m atrix A  G Co and sim ilarly we use the notation 6, for the 
weight any i  rows for B  E Ci. The construction w ill guarantee that o, =  6* as long as 
i  < k and that Ok ^  bk as required by the indistinguishability property.
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(3, n) TVSS scheme Let B  G be a matrix defined as follows,
B  =  (InJn,n—2)i
where In stands for the n x n identity m atrix and Jn,n-2 is the all one m atrix w ith n 
rows and n —2 columns. The m atrix A  G is defined as the complement of B.
We build the sets of share matrices Co and Ci by letting the appropriate permutation 
groups act on the rows and the columns of the matrices A  and B  respectively, as the 
previous section described.
Proposition 6.7. The scheme S =  (Co, C i) as defined in the previous paragraph is a 
l(3,n); 2n-2, n+ 1, n-3] TVSS scheme with contrast c =  4/(2n — 2).
Construction 2
In this section, assumed that 2 < k <  n. In order to construct (fe, n) TVSS schemes 
we make use of MDS codes over GF(q), the finite field w ith q elements. Because an 
[n ,k,n — k +  1] MDS code over GF(q) exists if  g +  1 >  n, we choose g >  n — 1.
We start by constructing the set C%. Let A be a n x g  ̂matrix over GF(q). The 
columns of A  consists of g*“ words of an [n, fe, n — fe +  1] code C over GF(q).
Lemma 6.8. Denote by A" the restriction of the matrix A to the first s rows. The 
columns of the matrix A^ contain each vector of the vector space GF{q)^ exactly once. 
Moreover, the restriction A*’"^ contains each vector of GF{q)^~^ exactly q times.
Lemma 6.8 holds for the restriction of A to any fe rows, as one sees by inspection 
of its proof. We derive a binary m atrix Â  G from the m atrix A by replacing all
non-zero entries of A by the element 1.
Lemma 6.9. Let denote the restriction of the matrix A  to the rows ii, . . . , ik
and denote by u® G GF{2Y the sum of the fe rows of the associated binary matrix 
Â®!’"-’**. Then,
Since the number .z(u^ (.) does not depend on the rows i i ,  we w ill further 
denote this number simply by z(v®). Put A i =  Â and define the set C i as the set of 
share matrices obtained by letting the permutation group Sgk act on the columns of 
the m atrix A.
Next, we describe the construction of the set C q. Denote by B o  an n x g*’“  ̂m atrix 
over GF(q) whose columns are the words of an [n, fc — 1, n — fc -4- 2] (MDS) code over 
GF(q)(this code exists since n <  g+1). The m atrix B  consists of g copies of the m atrix 
Bq and is hence an n x g*’ m atrix over GF(q).
Lemma 6.10. Denote by the restriction of the matrix B  to the rows i i ,  ...,ik-
Then, the columns of the matrix contain each vector of G F  (q)'  ̂ either zero orq
times. The columns of the matrix B®®*'"’®*-® contain each vector of the space G F(g)*“  ̂
exactly q times.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 6. IMPLEMENT VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY BY OTHER METHODS 44
We define the binary matrix Ê  be replacing in the matrix B  each non-zero entry 
by one. Put Aq =  È.
Lemma 6.11. Let Aq' denote the restriction of the matrix Aq to the rows i\ ,
Then, the number of zeroes in the sum vector uP ^  is given by
«  , J  =  z ( » ? )  +  ( g - l ) 2 ‘ - ' .
Again, we remark that the number z(u® does not depend on the rows i \ , i k -  
Therefore, we denote this number by z{v®). The set Co is then defined by letting the
permutation group Sgk act on the columns of Aq.
Construction 2 of a general (k,n) schemes
1. Choose q (power of a prime) w ith q > n ~ l .
2. Define the sets of share matrices Cq and C i as earlier in this section.
3. Define the scheme 5̂  =  (Co,Ci).
Theorem 6.12. The scheme S =  (Cq, C i) as defined in construction 2, is a [(k, n); g*’, 
z{v®), z{vf)\ TVSS scheme.
Finally, note that the contrast c of [{k,n); b, h, I] schemes in construction 2 is given
by 
c =  ( ( «  -  1 )2 ‘ - ‘ ) / ( 5 ‘  +  ( - 1 ) ‘ (9  -  2 ) ‘  +  (9  -  l ) 2 ‘ - ‘ ) .
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Chapter 7 
Visual Cryptography with cheating 
shares
In the past decade, the researchers were mainly concentrated on the improvement 
of the contrast and subpixel expansion. Consequently, a lot of papers w ith regard to 
these two directions are published. However, in these conventional visual cryptography 
schemes, there is an assumption that all the shareholders are inherently honest which 
means they do not take the people who may have effect on the security into account. 
Therefore, it  is no doubt that this assumption can cause a fatal security problem of 
visual cryptography.
In [14], the authors present one of the tra ito r’s cases: In {k, n) visual cryptography 
scheme, if  A: — 1 of shareholders become the traitors and then they pool their shares 
together and publish the resluting image, any other shareholders are able to obtain the 
secret image after stacking their own shares w ith the published one. Obviously, this 
traitorous behavior may collapse the visual cryptography system and it  is prohibited.
Here, we w ill describe another possible attack by the cheating shares and the method 
proposed by Naor and Pinkas [16] w ill be used to solve the problem.
7.1 Attack Statement
In the conventional visual cryptography, the shares distributed to the shareholders 
are printed on the whole transparency. Thus, after stacking their transparencies, the 
secret image is displayed. However, this process also provides a possible attack by the 
cheating shares.
Now, we consider the following situation: some shares are m odified by the share­
holders, so that other people might obtain wrong information when they reveal the 
image. This problem was discussed by Naor and Pinkas when they considered visual 
authentication and identification scheme in [16]. In fact, if  some shareholders alternate 
some pixels of their own shares (e.g., changing the white pixels to the black ones.), then 
overlaying the shares including the alternated ones w ill be accepted as the original one 
because none of the shareholders knows the secret image. Since every share is printed
45
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on the whole transparency, it is not difficult to change pixels of shares by a shareholder. 
We will call a shareholder traitor when he/she modified his/her share.
In terms of 2 out of 2 visual cryptography, there are two types of changes defined 
as follows [16].
•  Traitors can change the position of the two black subpixels in the squares in the 
image. This change cannot be noticed by the recipient.
•  Traitors can put more than or less than two black subpixels in a square. This 
produces an illegal share. However, this deviation will probably go unnoticed by 
recipient unless it is done in too many pixels.
Here, we first take a look at a simple example: The dealer encrypts the secret im­
age with information “EF” (Figure 7.1) to share 1 (Figure 7.2(a)) and share 2 (Figure
Figure 7.1: Original text with secret information “EF'
(a) Share 1 after E nc ryp tio n  (b) Share 2 a fte r E ncryp tion
Figure 7.2: Shares after Encryption
If we stacked them carefully, the correct secret image (Figure 7.3) will be acquired.
However, when the shareholder who holds the share 1 change to be a traitor, he 
changed his share 1 to shareS by alternating some pixels(Figure 7.4). It is obvious from 
Figure 7.4 th a t  we have no idea w hether th e  share has been changed or not. Therefore, 
after overlaying share2 and shareS, the wrong information ”FE” will be accepted as 
the original image and then the attack is successful.
In our proposed scheme, we consider four situations of that kind of attacks based 
on the destructive effect on cheating shares:
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Figure 7.3: Normal resulting image after Decryption
Figure 7.4: Share 3 changed from sharel by the traitor
Figure 7.5: The changed resulting image with different information ”FE”
•  Complete Success: The secret image is changed to a different meaning and honest 
shareholders cannot find the change, while the traitor can find out the correct 
original image.
•  Success: The secret image is changed. The honest shareholders are aware of the 
change, but do not know the original image. The traitor can find out the original 
image.
•  Partial Success: The secret image is changed. All the people are aware of the 
change but no one knows the original image.
•  Failure: The secret image is changed. All the people are aware of the change but
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they can s till find out the original image.
As the traitors, the higher-level attack they implement, the more success they w ill 
achieve.
For simplicity, we w ill first consider the 2-out-of-2 visual secret sharing scheme of 
[17]. In  this scheme an image is represented as a collection of pixels. Each pixel is 
represented by a square of 2 x 2 real pixels that are called subpixels. For the pixels on 
the plaintext, each of them is split into two shares w ith four subpixels such that two of 
subpixels are black and the others are white in each share. As Figure 3.1 illustrated, 
there are three types of arrangements of these black and white subpixels: vertical, 
horizontal and diagonal. Suppose that in first share one of the horizontal types is 
chosen in such a way that the two upper subpixels are black and the lower are white. 
I f  in the other share, the complementary type of horizontal shares is chosen in  which 
the lower subpixels are black and the upper subpixels are white, then stacking the 
two shares yields an image in which all four subpixels are black. I f  on the other hand 
the upper subpixels are black and the lower subpixels are white in the second share, 
then stacking the shares composes an image in which only two subpixels are black. 
Moreover, if  different types of subpixels are chosen(e.g., the first share is vertical and 
the second share is horizontal), then after stacking the shares the resulting pixel w ith 
three black subpixels which is also considered as white w ill be obtained. In Figure 
3.1, for each pixel, the first share is randomly chosen from one of the six options. I f  
the pixel is black, the second share w ill contain complementary subpixels and i f  the 
pixel is white, the second share w ill be the same as the first share or different types of 
subpixels .
Following the definition of visual cryptography, we w ill consider images containing 
black and white pixels only. In fact, we w ill mainly consider text images. The reason 
is that all the known visual cryptographic schemes w ill reduce the contrast of a image 
and therefore the useful real applications perhaps are for text images only.
There are three phases in our scheme.
1. Share creation: To create shares, a dealer randomly chooses a matrix from Cq 
for a white pixel and a m atrix from Ci for a black pixel (In addition, a m atrix 
from Cg defined later in our method for a grey pixel). The chosen matrices define 
the color of the m sub-pixels in each of the n shares. After this phase the dealer 
is no longer exits.
2. Share holding: There are n shareholders in the scheme, each of them keeps a 
share. During this phase, there are no computing lim itations for shareholders. 
The shareholders are able to analyze and modify the shares they possessed.
3. Image recovering: k of the n shareholders put their shares together to recover 
the original image. In this phase, the shareholders have very lim ited computing 
abilities. Basically, they only can align the shares and recognize the image by 
vision.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 7. VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH CHEATING SHARES 49
In our scheme, there is a dealer V  who w ill distribute the shares to the shareholders. 
We assume that the dealer is always honest and after share distribution, the dealer w ill 
be out of the scheme.
The shareholders have unlimited computation abilities during their share holding 
time. When the shareholders pool their shares together to reveal the visual information, 
their computation abilities are lim ited. However, sometimes we w ill assume they have 
some certain computation capacities (they have sharp eyes, as we explained later).
In this paper, we w ill use some techniques from [16]. Their scheme can be described 
as follows.
7.2 Visual Authentication and Identification Appli­
cation
7.2.1 Visual Authentication Scheme
In order to carry out the visual authentication application for the smart card system, 
Naor and Pinkas [16]put forward three methods which function as one-time pad au­
thentication. One of them that we w ill make advantage of is “ Position on Screen 
” method. Now we are going to describe it  in details. A t first, let us review some 
definitions of the visual authentication scheme.
D e fin itio n  7.1. {visual authentication scenario) There are three entities in the 
visual authentication scenario: H  (Harry), P(Peggy) and S(Sally). H  is human and 
has human visual capabilities. For each protocol the capabilities that are required from 
H  must be stated. These capabilities must include the ability to identify an image 
resulting from the composition of two shares of a 2-out-of-2 visual secret sharing. Other 
capabilities might be the ability to verify that a certain area is black, the ability to check 
whether two images are similar, etc.
There is a security parameter n, such that the storage capacities and computing 
power of S and P are polynomial in n.
In the initialization phase S produces a random string r, and creates a transparency 
Tr and some auxiliary information Ar as function of r. Their size is polynomial in  
the security parameter n. S send Tr and Ar to H  through an off-line initialization 
private channel to which P has no occess ( this is the only time this private channel 
is used). S also sends to H  a set of instructions that H  should perform in the protocol 
(e.g. checking at a certain point in time whether a certain area in the image is black, 
comparing two areas, etc). These instructions are public and might get known to F, 
but she is unable to change them.
Following the initialization phase all the communication between H  and S is done 
through a channel controlled by P, who might change the transferred messages.
D e fin itio n  7.2. (visual authentication protocol) S wishes to communicate to H  
an information piece m, the content of which is known to P.
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• S sends a message c to H, which is a function of m and r.
•  P might change the message c before H  receives it.
•  Upon receiving a message c’ H outputs either FAIL or < ACCEPT, m' >  as a 
function of c’ and his secret information Tr and Ar. When he outputs ACCEPT 
he also outputs m ’, what he thinks to be the information sent to him form S.
Next, the definition of security requirements from visual authentication systems is 
presented.
D e fin itio n  7.3. (  v isua l au then tica tion  system )  Assume that H  has the capabili­
ties required from him fo r the protocol, that he acts according to the instructions given 
in the protocol, and that the visual authentication system has the property that when P 
is faithful then H  always outputs < ACCEPT,m  >. we call the system
m (1 - p)-authentic i f  fo r any message m communicated from S to H  the probability 
that H  outputs < ACCEPT, m' >  is at most p (where m ’ is of course different 
from m).
(1 - p)-single-transform ation~secure ((1 - p)-sts) i f  fo r any message m com­
municated form S to H  and any m' ^  m (which was determined a-prior) the 
probability that H  outputs < ACCEPT, m' > is at most p.
Here the (1 - p)-authentic system is more securer than (1 - p)-sts visual authenti­
cation system because (1 - p)-sts visual authentication system only guarantee that it 
is hard to change the secret information to a specified message which was predefined.
Based on the definitions, we keep reviewing the “ Position on Screen ” method 
proposed in [16]. There are two essential elements of “ Position on Screen ” method 
which also provide the basic idea for our method.
•  Bounding Box: In the initialization phase, the authors establish some assump­
tions: The image is composed o frx c  pixels. A “bounding box” of size r 'x U  pixels 
is drawn w ith a thin line at a random location on the transparency that is given to 
the shareholders. During the authentication communication, the combination of 
the transparency and the communicated share should have the confidential mes­
sage displayed inside the bounding box, in white on a black background which 
covers all pixels inside and outside the bounding box. The Figure 7.6 illustrates a 
transparency w ith a marked bounding box and a composed image w ith message 
in the bounding box.
Obviously, the bounding box is very useful for us to prevent the attack mentioned 
in previous section. Due to random position of bounding box, even the tra ito r 
has a powerful cryptanalytic ability, it  is a low possibility that he can obtain the 
right position of share on the transparency. Therefore, alternating the color of 
pixels in other areas of transparency w ill make no sense to the real share. I f  the 
tra itor alternates the pixels in a large area of the transparency, he also fails to
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implement a successful or higher level attack because the shareholder w ill find 
out the share is changed by someone. So this property of bounding box prevent 
the high level attacks effectively.
•  P reviously K now n P osition: As the Figure 7.6 illustrated, the position of 
bounding box is marked on transparency and hence the shareholder previously 
knows the position of share on the transparency. Also, the message should be 
displayed in white on a black ground after stacking the shares. These two proper­
ties are good enough to prevent two types of attacks. I f  the tra itor change pixels 
of areas besides the valuable message on the transparency, it  is easy to be no­
ticed and it  also warns the shareholder of being more careful w ith her own share 
next time. Moreover, if  the tra ito r carry out another successful attack in which 
a false share is also put on the transparency to make the consumer confused, the 
shareholder can recognize the real one because of previously known position of 
bounding box. However, this property is not applicable to our method and thus 
we modify it to satisfy our scheme(we w ill explain it  later).
Figure 7.6: (a)The bounding box depicted on user’s transparency (b) The composed 
image
Moreover, the authors considered two situations of the shareholders. One of them is 
Sharp Eyed user. In  this case, the shareholder are assumed to be having two abilities:
•  The shareholder is able to detect the difference between the displayed image and 
the specific message m ' that the adversary would like to display even a single 
pixel located in the bounding box.(e.g., the shareholder sees an incomprehensible 
image or considers the displayed image as the original one different from the m’)
•  The shareholder has the capability to notice the image having a pixel in which 
the number of black subpixels is not exactly two.
Therefore, the adversary has to change the pixels in the proper area of the transparency. 
I f  the w idth and height of bounding box are r ' and d  respectively, there are ( r—r')(c —o') 
equally likely different sets of pixels to be reversed. Then if  the adversary chooses the 
wrong set of pixels, she failed. The probability of success is therefore at most
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Another situation is a not so Sharp Eyed which is more useful for ordinary users.
The authors assume that the shareholder has the capability to detect differences of t 
pixels or more between the displayed message and the image w ith the m' in the correct 
bounding box (actually, t  might depend on the m '). I f  the number of different pixels is 
at least t, then the adversary fails. Also, another type of attack can be detected if  more 
than f  pixels has more than or less than two black subpixels. Based on the analysis 
and a series of Claims in section 3.2.2 of [16], the following theorem ( Theorem 9 of 
[16] ) is obtained.
Theorem 7.4. Let r  be the number of rows of the image, and let c be the number of 
columns. Let r ' and d be these values regarding the bounding box. Let rn be the message 
and let m' be a semantically different message. Assume that the human recipient has 
the following capabilities: any image with hamming distance greater than t from m ’ is 
not captured by recipient as being m', and recipient notices i f  more than t ’ pixels in 
the image displayed to him have more than or less than two black subpixels. Then, in 
authentication system we described the adversary can convince the user to identify the 
message as m' with probability at most
In the previous paragraphs, we discussed the properties of “ Position on the screen” 
method. Obviously, the method is one-time pad which means it  is only for single au­
thentication because the location of the bounding box is previously known by the share­
holders. In  order to make the method secure for several authentications, a straightfor­
ward approach is constructed. They store the several copies of the previous method 
in different areas of a single transparency, where each copy depend on the security 
parameters which define the size of the area that is used by each copy, and on the size 
of the transparency.
Following the construction, the authors define the many-times security and demon­
strate how to construct an efficient many-times authentication from the “Position on 
screen” method. We w ill first review the definition of many-times security.
Definition 7.5. (n-times security) A visual authentication system is n-times(l - p)- 
single-transformation-secure(n-times(l - p)-sts) i f  the following is true fo r any n mes­
sages <  Tni,m2, ...,m „ > . For any message m i(l < i <  n) communicated from 
S to H, and any message m' different from m,, the probability that H  outputs < 
ACCEPT, m' >  is at most p. I f  P is faithful then H  should always output < ACCEPT, m >.
The settings are established as follows. Let the message that should be authenti­
cated be of size r ' x d pixels. The parameters ro, cq are the security parameters. Let 
the size of transparency be r  x c, where r  =  ro +  Urd and c =  co +  ^cd. The trans­
parency is used for n =  UrUc authentications. The Figure 7.7 illustrates the process of 
the many-times authentications.
In the initialization phase, A random start point {io,jo) is chosen where 1 <  *o <
I  d  Jq <  Cq. a  grid of n^Uc areas which are composed of r 'd  pixels, is drawn starting 
from the location {io,jo). The i-th  area is defined as the area in the intersection of row 
\ i/n f ]  and column { i mod Uc) -f 1. Thus, the i-th  authentication is easily implement
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Figure 7.7: Many-times visual authentication scheme
in terms of the previous description. When the dealer sends her share of the message 
rtii in the %-th area of the grid, and in other pixels on the transparency have and only 
have two black subpixles, the recipient would verify that the message after stacking his 
share on the i-th  area.
Moreover, the authors also figure out the probability of being attack in the case of 
many-times authentications (Theorem 12 of [16]).
Theorem  7.6. Assume that i f  the hamming distance between the displayed image and 
an image m' is greater than t  then the human recipient does not perceive the displayed 
image cbs m '. Also assume that the user notices i f  in more than tf pixels the number of 
black subpixels is not two. Then a transparency of size {ro+Urd) x (cQ+Ucd) pixels can 
be used to get an UrUc-times (l-p)-single-transformation-secure visual authentication 
system, where each message is of size d  x d pixels, and where p =  .
In this paper, we w ill propose our method to reduce the possibifity of attacks. 
Also, we w ill make use of the basic idea of this authentication method to improve the 
security of visual cryptography when facing the cheating shares created by traitors. 
Furthermore, a modification w ill be made in the proposed method which is not only 
better for preventing the cheating shares but also applicable to visual authentication 
scheme.
7.2.2 The Proposed M ethod for Visual Authentication Scheme
In  “Position on Screen” method, the usage of bounding box has an effect on preventing 
the attack by the tra itor. When the tra itor receives the share from the dealer and then 
implements the attack, the changes alternated outside the bounding box w ill make 
no sense to the recognition of original image by honest shareholder. I t  is obvious that 
only the low-level attack can be obtained. In addition, as we mentioned in  the previous 
section, the random position of bounding box can also reduce the possibifity of being 
attacked by traitors.
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As a matter of fact, there exist some differences between the visual cryptography 
and visual authentication schemes. The main difference is that the position can not 
be previously known by the shareholder who might become the tra itor. Otherwise, the 
existence of bounding box is out of use because the tra itor can change the original image 
without difficulty. Therefore, the difference cause the “Position on screen” method not 
completely apphcable to the visual cryptography and we have to modify it  to satisfy 
the our scheme.
share
Figure 7.8: Success Attack w ith false share
In our proposed method, the location of share on the transparency is random every 
time and more importantly it  should be hidden to the shareholders. However, we 
have to note that the visual cryptography w ill go through a successful attack under 
this condition. Although the traitors did not know the location of the share, he can 
make a similar share and put it  on an appropriate position. Then after overlaying the 
transparencies, two resulting shares w ill be shown on the superimposed transparencies. 
Obviously, the tra ito r definitely knows the real secret image but the honest shareholder 
cannot differentiate it  (Figure 7.8). In terms of the definition we described before, we 
consider this type of attack as the successful attack. In fact, this attack is not only 
the reason why we make the position of share random on the transparency to enlarge 
the possibility of the intersection between the real and false shares, but also the reason 
why we modify the method to be applicable for the 2-out-of-2 visual cryptography 
scheme(We w ill explain it  later).
Although the proposed method we present is possibly attacked by the successful 
attack, it  is good enough for the visual authentication scheme in smart card system. 
Generally, we assume that if  the consumer sees both true and false shares on his trans­
parency in the transaction, he w ill refuse to make the payment and ask the merchant 
to show the price again. Due to the random position of the share every time, the 
merchant cannot deduce the position and implement the completely successful attack.
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However, in many-times authentications, the merchant is able to deduce the position 
of the i-th  authentication based on the previous transactions.
Therefore, our method outweighs the previous authentication method. Next we w ill 
compare these two methods at length.
7.2.3 Comparison
Now, we w ill compute the possibilities of being attacked by traitors and demonstrate 
our proposed method is better than many-times “Position on screen” method of visual 
authentication scheme.
Although many-times method has made a great progress compared to the one-time 
method, the probability that the adversary implements a successful attack is larger 
than that of our method. Following from Figure 7.7 and Theorem 7, this probability is 
and we can figure out the probability of our method given the same conditions.
The start points of bounding boxes are defined as ( io ,  j o )  and they are chosen from 
the area of tq x cq as Figure 7.7 illustrated. For our method, due to the unknown position 
of the share on transparency, the traitors need to guess it every time. Consequently, 
every left upper point of bounding box is the possible start point and the start points 
are chosen from the area w ith the size of (r — r ')  x (c — c'). Then the probability of 
being attacked successfully in our method is
Next, we w ill discuss about the relationship between toCq and (r —r')(c  —c/). Given 
a fixed size of transparency, if  the roCo is set to be larger, the corresponding times of 
authentications w ill be reduced because they are satisfied the equations r  =  ro -f- n^r' 
and c =  Cq -f ricc'. When r  — r ' =  tq and c — cf =  cq, only one authentication can be 
carried out (where Ur =  1, Uc =  1). Therefore, roCo is much smaller than (r — r')(c  — o') 
and hence the probability that traitors implement the successful attack in  our method 
is much smaller than that of visual authentication scheme.
Furthermore, it  is easy to find out that this probability of our method is the same 
as that of the one-time “Position on screen” method for preventing the attack. How­
ever, in the ’’Position on screen” method, if  the consumer is careless and the marked 
position of her share is noticed by cheating merchant, then the cheating merchant can 
implement the completely successful attack on the right position. For example, in the 
smart card system mentioned in  [16], the cheater can ask the consumer to pay the 
amount of money more than the real price because he has the capability of carrying 
out the completely attack. Supposed that the cheater who is responsible not only for 
communicating w ith the bank but also displaying the amount of money should be paid 
by consumer plays a role as merchant. She can te ll the consumer that he has to  pay 
her $1 but demands $10 from the smart card. She w ill know that the information 
that the smart card w ill send to consumer contains $10 and thus when she gets the 
share that the smart card asks her to display she can deduce the content of the trans­
parency. Then she can alternate the image which w ill result in the message containing 
$1. Also, the consumer cannot be aware of the cheating behavior. Then the cheater can 
obtain the authentication from consumer and meanwhile modify the real price when
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communicating w ith banks. This is the reason why the visual cryptography can not 
be directly used for authentication mentioned in [16]. However, in our method, the 
unmarked bounding box on the transparency is more securer because we do not have 
to worry about the cheating merchant peeks the position of the share on transparency.
As a whole, we can make a conclusion that for smart card system, our proposed 
method is better than the “Position on screen” method in visual authentication scheme 
because of the unknown position of share on the transparency that results in the small 
possibilities of being attacked.
7.3 Model
In fact, the main difference between the previous visual authentication method and our 
proposed method is whether the position of the share is previously known. In our case, 
if  the location of the share on the transparency is known by shareholders in advance, 
the protection fails. Therefore, only the dealer who implements the encryption and 
distributes the shares can know the location of the share and after encryption, he w ill 
be out of the scheme. Based on this assumption, we w ill discuss about the security 
parameters and the relationship between the size of shares and transparencies. A t first, 




We refer to all the elements in Figure 7.9 as follows. S is the symbol of the-middle-
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size rectangle that represents the share . T  is the symbol of the biggest rectangle that 
stands for the transparency. A  is the symbol of changed area. Denote a, b by the width 
and height of T  and denote w, h by the width and height of S. The width and height 
of A are s and t respectively. Let {U, V") be the central point of the S, then (U, Y ) is 
two-dimensional random vector having uniform distribution in T. Let (AT, Y) be the 
central point of changed area and it  satisfies the same condition of {U,V).
In next section, different attacks w ill be described in terms of the model and some 
results relate to the security w ill be obtained.
7.4 Attacks with different levels
We have defined four-level attacks in section 7.1. Now, we are going to find the better 
proportion between the size of transparency and share to reduce the possibility of 
attacks.
7.4.1 Partially Successful Attack
For partial success, the shareholders and the traitors are aware of the change, but 
nobody can recognize the secret image. Here, we assume that if  the changed area has 
the intersection, even a single pixel, w ith the share, then attack is partially successful.
Therefore, to calculate the possibility of the attack has been transformed to cal­
culate the possibifity of the intersection between the S and changed area. Then the 
following conditions should be satisfied:
{(U ,V ,X ,Y ) : — < [/  (^-1)
-  <  X  <  a - < Y  < b - - ,  (7.2)
\ U - X \ <  | r  -  VI < (7.3)
This four-dimensional space can be computed by the following method: we first con­
sider the s, t  and their distribution, and then we can work out the possibilities of
intersection between the share and the changed area if  the distribution of s and t  is
known.The formula of computing the possibilities is fisted as follows:
P (5  n  A #  0) =  r  t  P { S n A ^  0|s, t)dsdt (7.4)
J q J o
Where f {s,  t) is the probability density function of random variables (s, f). As a matter 
of fact, the random variables s, t  can be set to the different distributions. Now, in our
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method, we consider the uniform distribution of s and t.
1 i f  s > a — w, t  > b — h
,(1 “  ^ (1 "  (b-h)(è-t)) i f  s < a - w , t  < b - h
Obviously, when a > s +  w and b >  h +  t, the smallest possibility of partially successful 
attack would be achieved. The value of P{SnA  ^  0|s, t) is applicable to the possibility 
formula in which f{s, t) =  ^  satisfies the uniform distribution.
P ( g n A f  0) =  J ' ’ P {Sn  A ÿ^(ù\s,t)f{s,t)dsdt (7.6)
=  % - (f-ftjfrii))■
Now we w ill consider the specific case when the share is uniformly distributed on 
the transparency. To be a good tra itor, everything he needs to do is magnify the 
possibility of the attack as large as he can. Therefore, he would try  to find the best 
ways to implement the attack w ith fu ll possibility.
Theorem 7.7. I f  Share is uniformly distributed on the transparency, The best way to 
attack the share is also uniformly distributed.
Proof: Following from the previous model, to find the distribution of the best 
attack, we have to figure out the possibility of the attack given the distribution of the 
central point (X , Y) of changed area. Then we get deduce the inequality which the 
central point satisfy.
{ { IJ,V,X,Y)  : — < ( 7 < a - —, - < y  <  5 -  - ,  (7.8)
P - X \ < ' ! ^ , \ Y - V \ < ' : ^ }  (7.9)
Suppose that the distribution of central point is uniform, then it  satisfies the
0 otherwise
(7.10)
In fact, based on these conditions, we can list sixteen different cases when discussing 
about the relationships among them. For example, when X + ^ ^  <  a—f ,
Y —h ^  >  Y < 6— k are satisfied, the possibility h{x, y) is computed as follows.
(a -  W)\b -  h)
where w <  ^ , h <  Especially when w — ^  and h — h{x,y) — 1.
Obviously, the central point (X, Y) that satisfies the uniform distribution is the 
best way of implementing the attack.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 7. VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH CHEATING SHARES 59
7.4.2 Completely Successful Attack
As the traitors, the goal is to implement the completely successful attack. In  our 
method, we assume that if  the changed area is included in the share, the attack w ill 
be considered as the complete success. Consequently, s <  w, t < h is predefined, 
we also define two parameters which depend on the requirement of the secret image : 
e(0 <  £■ < 1), security parameter and ^(0 <  0 < 1), the percentage of changeable area 
in shares.
According to the requirement of security, e can be classified into three levels: 
low(O.l), medium(O.Ol) and high(O.OOl). Because different images and texts have dis­
tinct changeable area, then only the dealer can determine the size of changeable area 
for every secret visual information. Therefore, the 6 is set up for the dealer. According 
to the previous description, the following conditions should be satisfied:
{([/, y, X, y )  : 8 < w, t  < h, |[/ -  x |  < |y  -  y  I < ^ ,  (7.11)
- < X < a  — - , - < Y  < 6 — - ,  (712)
^ < [ / < a - ^ , ^ < y < 6 - ^ }  ' (7.13)
To reduce the possibility of attacks, the following possibility is chosen.
f  (a  n  A  0) =  (1 -  (7.14)
a — s o — t
Now we w ill have an example given the specified security parameters. Suppose 
the security level is defined as medium (e =  0.01), and the convertible area is g (For 
example, s =  ^w,t  =  |/ i)  of the share.
P ( s n 7 l ^ 0 )  =  ( l - ^ ) ( l - | ^ )  (7.15)
H i - ) ^ ) ( i - ^ ) < o . o i  (7.ia)
Then we can compute the results: a > 7w, b > 7h. According to this result, the 
dealer can design the size of the share and transparency. In fact, when processing 
different secret information, the dealer can work out this value depending on require­
ments of security parameters of the information. Then it is certain that he is able to 
reduce the attack possibility in terms of this value.
7.5 Visual Cryptography Scheme Application
7.5.1 Definition and Setting
As we mentioned before, our proposed method may go through the successful attack 
by using the false share in the visual cryptography scheme(Figure 7.8). For 2-out-of-2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 7. VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH CHEATING SHARES 60
visual cryptography scheme, the honest shareholder is unable to determine which share 
is real but the tra ito r can differentiate them. In order to prevent this kind of attacks, 
we w ill improve the proposed method as follows.
We previously used the 2-out-of-2 visual cryptography scheme defined by Naor and 
Shamir in which all four subpixels of a black pixel are black, whereas a white pixel has 
two or three black subpixels. Now we w ill modify the definition: a black pixel has four 
black subpixels, a white pixel has two black subpixels, and we define a pixel having 
three black subpixels as grey.
Following from the definition of visual cryptography, we add the grey pixels to our 
method more specifically. Co and Ci are previously defined as the matrices of white 
and black pixels respectively. Let the matrices of grey pixels be denoted as Cg. Then 
we list the Co, C\, Q  of 2-out-of-2 visual cryptography scheme as follows.
_  r j o o i i  1/0101 \ r i o i o \ r n o o \  r 1001 \ r o i i o \ i
° l l o o i l j  (0101 /  \1010J (1100j  (1001 j  (0110 /J
r  -  I I O llO l / 0011( / lO lO l /1001 (  / llOOl /0101(1
^  (  IIOOIJ (1100/ (0101/ (0110/ (0011/ (1010 / /
(7.17)
(7.18)
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Obviously, for a white pixel, there are 6 different permutations of matrices as well 
as for a black pixel. When the black(white) pixel is selected, the dealer can choose one 
of the options from Ci (Cq). Also, there are 24 elements in the matrices of grey pixels 
and if  the grey pixels is selected, the dealer w ill choose one of them from Cg.
Next, we w ill discuss the changes among white, black, and grey pixels to verify that 
grey pixels have more advantanges.
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white black switch the positions of the black and white subpixels
grey change the position of one black subpixel
black white switch the positions of the black and white subpixels
grey change the position of one black subpixel
grey black move a right black subpixel to a proper position
white move a right black subpixel to a proper position
grey move the black subpixels in all ways except above two
Prom the table, we find the fact that it  is not diflacult for tra ito r to change the 
pixel from black to white or grey as well as to change the pixel from white to black 
or grey. However, for changing the pixel from grey to white or black, it  is hard to 
choose the right black subpixel and then move it to a proper position. Actually the 
tra ito r must know he w ill fail to change the grey color if he chooses the complement 
of his current subpixels arrangement and hence this case w ill not be considered by the 
tra itor. After the movement of one subpixel, if  the changed subpixels are arranged 
the same as the other share, it  must be alternated to a white pixel and if  the changed 
subpixels compose the complement of the other share, it  must be alternated to a black 
pixel. Then we compare the possibility between changing the pixel from grey to white 
or black and keeping its original color. When the tra ito r change the pixel from grey to 
white or black, the possibility that the tra ito r perform a successful attack are only 
I  respectively and hence the possibility that the grey pixels do not change the color 
is (Figure 7.10). Apparently, it  is more likely that the tra ito r cannot change grey 
pixel to other two colors.
7.5.2 Grey Background M ethod
In terms of the analysis and facts, we found that the grey pixels are more difficult to 
be changed than black and white pixels. Thus, we apply this property of grey pixels to 
our “ Grey Background ” method. First, the previously proposed method in which the 
share w ith black letters in white background is printed on the transparency randomly 
is also adopted. Additionally, in order to prevent the previous method from being 
attacked by the false share, the transparency except the real share are assumed to be 
composed of grey pixels(Figure 7.11).
Now we are going to demonstrate the advantages of the “ Grey Background ” 
method. As we described before, after the tra ito r finished a successful attack by a false 
share, the honest shareholder w ill be confused by differentiating a real share and a false 
share but the tra itor w ifi certainly know the real share. As a tra itor, he is supposed to 
deduce an appropriate position of transparency and then alternate the color of some 
pixels in the area to display the content that he wishes. In fact, it  is not difficult for the 
tra itor to alternate pixels from white to black and vice versa in our previous method. 
Thus, the tra itor can easily implemented this kind of successful attack.
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Figure 7.10: The attacks on the grey pixel
However, Due to the application of grey pixels in the “ Grey Background ” method, 
even if  the tra ito r knows the background is grey, it  is not easy for him to carry out an 
attack successfully. Note that we follow the assumption from the visual authentication 
scheme that the shareholder has sharp eyes so that he can identify the pixel that 
has more or less than two subpixels on the transparency. Accordingly, the honest 
shareholder w ill consider a pixel without having two subpixels as a invalid pixel.
Figure 7.11: The improved method for Visual Cryptography Scheme 
The assumption lim its the tra ito r not only to consider how to change the pixel from
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grey to the color that he wishes to display but also to consider how to balance each 
pixel to have two subpixels. For example, if  he would like to change the grey pixels 
to the black ones which represent the content of the share as we defined, he can only 
obtain a quarter successful possibility for each pixel. Supposed that the content of 
the false share is composed of n black pixels, then the possibifity that the tra ito r can 
display the content correctly is ( | ) ” . By such a small possibifity, it  is obviously d ifficu lt 
for the tra itor to implement an attack by use of the false share.
Although “ Grey Background ” method has been verified to be effective to prevent 
visual cryptography scheme from being attacked by traitors, there s till exist some 
drawbacks. According to the definition of grey pixel for 2-out-of-2 visual cryptography 
scheme, it  is obvious that the hamming distance between the grey pixels and white 
or black pixels is 1. So the main drawback of this method is that it  reduces the 
contrast of the displayed image. Note that our method is designed for 2-out-of-2 visual 
cryptography scheme and actually it  is more complex for the tra itor to change the color 
of pixels in k out of n visual cryptography. We w ill discuss the attacks in the following 
section.
7.6 Attacks on k out of n visual cryptography schemes
In the previous sections, we focused on the 2 out of 2 visual cryptography to simplify the 
descriptions of our method. Actually, all the k out of n can be attacked by the traitors. 
Therefore, we would verify the fact and explain how to attack these visual cryptography 
schemes in details based on the constructions of Naor and Shamir’s schemes.
For 2 out of n visual cryptography, the only change we need to make is switching 
the positions of 1 and 0 in one row (share) of C q and C i respectively. Then after 
overlaying the shares, the white pixels are changed into black and and the black pixels 
are changed into white.
In 3 out of 3 visual cryptography, each pixel is split into 4 subpixels (two white 
subpixels and two blacksubpixels) for each share. No matter what the pixel is white or 
black, if  we switch the position of all the black and white subpixels in any one of the 
rows of Co or Ci, the attack is also successfully carried out.
Similarly, i f  all the I's  are changed into O's and all the O's are changed into I's  in 
one of the rows of Co or C%, the 4 out of 4 visual cryptography can also be attacked 
by changing the black(white) pixels to the white(black).
Thus, for a ll the k out of k visual cryptography scheme, the Hamming weight of 
black pixels is one more than that of white pixels in the resulting image. It also can 
be seen from the matrices Co and Ci that one of columns are all O's in C q and at least 
one 1 in each column of C%. Then after switching the equal and enough number of 
black and white subpixels in one of the rows of Co or C i, traitors can reverse the color 
of pixels. Note that this attack can be finished by only one traitor.
Moreover, the k out of n visual cryptography is more complicated than k out of k 
visual cryptography. For example, in  3 out of n visual cryptography scheme [17], let 
B  be the black n x (n — 2) m atrix which contains only I ’s, and let I  be the identity
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n x n  m atrix which contains I ’s on the diagonal and O’s elsewhere. Let B I  denote the 
n X (2n — 2) matrix obtained b y  concatenating B  and I ,  and let c{BI)  be the Boolean 
complement of the m atrix BI .  Then
Co =  {  all the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of c{BI)  }
C l =  {  all the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of B I  }  has the prop­
erties: Any single share (row) contains an arbitrary collection of n  — 1 black and n —1 
white subpixels; any pair of shares have n black subpixels composed of two individual 
black and n  — 2 black subpixels; any stacked trip le t of shares from C q has n black 
subpixels, whereas any stacked trip le t of shares from C i has n  - f  1 black subpixels. 
More specifically, one element of the C q and C% are
f o o .. . 0 0 1 ... 1 \
Cq =
0 0 .. . 0 1 0 ... 1
0 ... 0 1 1 ...0 y
( 1 1 . . 1 1 0 ... 0 \
C i  =
1 1 .. . 1 0 1 ... 0
\ 1 1 ... 1 0 0 ...1 /
respectively.
From the above two matrices, i t  is clear that if  the tra ito r would like to change 
the white pixel into the black, he can switch the positions between two black subpixels 
and two white subpixels. Then we can find Hamming weight of the stacked trip le t of 
shares from Cq has become n -t-1. However, the change of the black pixel from Ci  is 
difficult for one tra itor to make. To change the pixel from black to white, the tra ito r 
has to decide which 1 exists the specific column which has only a 1 . The probability 
that the tra itor can choose the right 1 is Thus, this attack by only one tra ito r is 
the event w ith low probability if  n is large enough.
Now we consider the situation that two of shareholders are traitors. When these 
traitors contact w ith each other and pull together their shares, they can implement the 
attack by the following method. From one of matrices Ci  described above, two stacked 
shares cannot reveal any information because the black pixels cannot be distinguishable 
from the white ones. However, the tra ito r can detect the subpixels of their shares by 
computers. They w ill not change the subpixels if  they find two subpixels are black 
in the same column, whereas if  they find the color of two subpixels is different in the 
same column, they w ill switch the position between the black subpixel in one of these 
columns and the white subpixel in one of the other similar columns in one of the shares. 
Then the Hamming weight of the stacked shares is reduced to n and the black pixel is 
changed into white.
Although the change from black pixels to white is not easy for one tra itor, it  is not 
hard for two traitors to implement. Thus, in k out of n visual cryptography scheme, 
the method of changing the pixels from white to black is the same as the k out of k 
visual cryptography schemes. Furthermore, if  any A: — 1 or less shareholders become
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traitors, the change of pixels from black to white is also easy. Here we are not going 
to analyze the different cases of k out of n visual cryptography schemes.
Based on the previous descriptions, the k out of n visual cryptography can be 
attacked if the shares are printed on the whole transparencies. In fact, in order to 
avoid distorting the aspect ratio of image and improve the contrast in 2-out-of-2 visual 
cryptography scheme, the number of subpixels had been changed from 2 to 4. Then 
the Hamming weight distance between black and white pixels is also changed from 
1 to 2. However, for other k out of k visual cryptography schemes in [17], there is 
only one Hamming weight distance between the black and white pixels. Therefore, 
“ Grey Background ” method seems not apphcable to these schemes. As a matter 
of fact, the contrast of resulting image has been improved by the researchers in  the 
past[18, 5, 8, 3, 24]. According to the previous literatures regarding the contrast 
improvement, we are able to apply the “ Grey Background ” method in which although 
the contrast of visual cryptography scheme is reduced again by adding the definition 
of grey pixels, it  guarantees the security of visual cryptography.
For example, in the original definition of 3-out-of-3 visual cryptography scheme, 
the black and white pixels are chosen from the following Ci  and Cq.
/OOllX
Co =  {a ll the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of j 0101 j }
\0110/
/ 1100\
Cl  =  {a ll the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of j 1010 j }
\ io o iy
Obviously, the superimposition of three transparencies from Co is 3/4 black, whereas 
the superimposition of three transparencies from Ci  is completely black. Therefore, the 
grey pixels can not be added because only one Hamming weight distance between the 
white and black pixels. We have to find another solution for the contrast of 3-out-of-3 
visual cryptography scheme so that we are able to make use of the grey pixels to protect 
the visual cryptography from the attacks. In order to increase the Hamming weight 
distance between white and black pixels, we enlarge the size of subpixel expansion m to 
obtain a better contrast. Then the novel matrices of white ( C q) and black (Q ) pixels 
are defined as follows.
/OO ll 0011 \
Co =  {a ll the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of j 0101 0101 1 }
\0110 0110/  
/ilO O  1100\
Cl =  {a ll the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of j 1010 1010 j }
\1001 lO O l/
From the above definition, we can obtain the fact that the stack of three transparen­
cies from Co is 6/8 black and the stack of three transparencies from Ci is completely 
black. I t  is obvious that there exist two Hamming weight distances between white and 
black pixels. Therefore, we are able to apply the grey pixels having 7/8 black subpixels 
that can be distinguished from white and black pixels to 3-out-of-3 visual cryptography
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scheme. Based on the previous analysis, it is difficult for traitors to change the color of 
grey pixels and the protection of visual cryptography by “ Grey Background ” method 
is available again.
In the case of the application of “ Grey Background ” method, the honest sharehold­
ers can discovery some areas of the transparency have been changed w ith meaningless 
content which may be composed of black ,white or grey pixels. Also, the similar attack 
and protection w ill take place in k out of n visual cryptography schemes because it is 
more complex for traitors to alternate the pixel from grey to other colors.
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Conclusion
Visual cryptography may not be as much of great practical importance as other research 
fields in cryptography although the idea of visual authentication schemes might be of 
practical value. However, visual cryptography is a hot topic for teaching purpose, and 
introducing the cryptographic ideas to a wide audience. Besides, i t ’s a lot of fun [7]. 
Moreover, visual cryptography has been applied to practice [15, 13].
In this thesis, we described the secret sharing scheme which is the basic idea of visual 
cryptography firstly. Then we reviewed the previous literatures on visual cryptograr 
phy from three different fields: Contrast improvement, colored visual cryptography and 
implementing visual cyrptography by other methods. Among these fields, contrast im­
provement is the hottest topic and has caught a lot of attention from the researchers. 
It  involves improving the quality of resulting images to makes them more recogniz­
able. Another field is extending the black-and-white visual cryptography scheme to 
the colored one. Obviously, the colored visual cryptography scheme is more compli­
cated. Thus, un til now, the researchers s till cannot find a good solution to carry out 
it. Moreover, the researchers try  to find the novel ways which are different from the 
Naor and Shamir’s for visual cryptography. In fact, a few approaches have been found 
but they also seem not good enough. Although we have made a progress on visual 
cryptography schemes, it  s till left a lot of problems that deserve further work.
However, in the previous literatures, none of them was concerned about the security 
of visual cryptography. The shareholders in their schemes are inherently assumed to 
be honest and hence they did not take the human cheating behavior into account. My 
thesis is the first paper which proposes the possible attack by the cheating shareholder 
called tra ito r (e.g. the tra ito r alternate the pixies of his own share and then damage 
the secret image).
To prevent this potential attack, we make advantage of the method in visual authen­
tication scheme [16]. The “Position on screen” method in [16] provides the essential 
idea of our method. We also improve this method to make it  applicable to visual 
cryptography scheme. Then we compare the possibilities of being attacked by traitors 
between these two methos and we find that our mehtod is much better than many-times 
“Position on screen” method when considering the possiblity of being attacked. Thus,
67
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our mehtod is also able to be applied to the visual authentication scheme to reduce the 
possibility of attacks. However, we found that the proposed method may go through 
a successful attack by using a false shae in visual cryptography scheme. Then “ Grey 
Background ” method is put forward in which we add the definition of grey pixels and 
verify that the grey pixels can prevent such a successful attack effectively.
Purthemore, we establish a mathamtical model to compute the possilibity of attacks 
given different situations: Partial success and success. From the results of these math­
amtical analysis, some facts are also obtained and they are benificial for our research.
For simplicity, we only make use of 2-out-of-2 visual cryptography to discuss our 
method at first. In section 7.6, we extend the dicussion to k out of n scheme for more 
general cases.
In our method, there are some open questions left. In fact, we consider that if  the 
2-out-of-2 visual cryptography scheme is composed of the black and white pixels, it  can 
probably be attacked by the tra itor. We left this question to be demonstrated in  the 
future research. Moreover, the contrast of displayed image is required to be improved.
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